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By: Elisabeth Pendley·

Part 1. Deregulation Of The Natural Gas Industry
After the surpluses and shortages of natural gas supplies in the 1970s, and the clamor
of producers for less federal control in the 1980s, heretical talk of "regulating" the natural gas
industry by deregulation crept into the halls of Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (F.E.R.C.). Two magical words: "market-based rates" and "competition" were
announced and would drive the deregulation of the natural gas industry. 1
The frrst actions were the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 19892 and
F.E.R.C.'s Open Access Tra.I_lsportation Order (Order No. 436) in response to the Act. 3 The
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act freed the price of producers' gas at the wellhead from
the multi-tiered (multi-flavored) pricing restrictions imposed by the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978. Now producers were able to charge non-regulated contract prices for the sale of gas
from the wellhead.
The F.E.R.C. Open Access Transportation Order encouraged pipeline companies to
open their pipelines voluntarily to third party shippers. While this was a "voluntary"
undertaking, F.E.R.C. provided sufficient carrot-and-stick incentives that pipelines complied

'Ms. Pendley is a 1976 graduate of the University of Wyoming School of Law. During the 13 years she was
employed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, she held various positions in the Office of General Counsel,
including Special Assistant to the General Counsel. She was Assistant General Counsel at KN Energy, Inc., and is
now in the private practice of law in Colorado. This paper, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, was produced under
the auspices of the El Paso Natural Gas Law Fellowship 1995, Natural Resources Law Center, School of Law,
University of Colorado at Boulder.
1
Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 436,50 FR 42408 (Octl8,
1985), FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 1982·1985] P30,665, at 31,481-482 ( 1985), vacated and
remanded, Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, 824 F. 2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988),
readopted on an interim basis, Order No. 500, 52 FR 30334 (Aug. 14, 1987), FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regulations
Preambles, 1986-1990] P30,76l (1987), remanded, American Gas Association v. PERC, 888 F. 2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1989), readopted, Order No. 500-H, 54 FR 52344 (Dec. 21, 1989), FERC Stats. & Regs. (Regulations Preambles
1986-1990] P30,867 ( 1989), reh' g granted in part and denied in part, Order No. 500-1, 55 FR 6605 (Feb. 26, 1990),
FERC Stats. & Regs. [Regulations Preambles 1986-1990] P30,880 (1990), afT'd in part and remanded in part,
American Gas Association v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I ll S. Ct. 957 (1991). (Order No.
436); Order No. 436, at 31,470.

1

Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, PL 101-60 (HRI722), 103 Stat 157,. 15 USCA 3301, July.26,

1989.
3

Order No. 436, supra.

2

with the order and third party shippers (producers, marketers, aggregators) began to transport
gas on these open access pipelines.
While both the Wellhead Decontrol Act and voluntary open access transportation
provided increased supply options, these changes were not enough to bring about the
regulators' vision of market-based rates and competition. This would be accomplished by the
issuance of F.E.R.C.'s natural gas restructuring rule (Order No. 636) in the spring of 1992. 4
As stated in Order No. 636, the rule "will fmalize the structural changes in the
Commission's regulation of the natural gas industry. This rule will therefore reflect and
finally complete the evolution to competition in the natural gas industry . . . [T)his promotion
of competition among gas suppliers will benefit all gas consumers and the nation by
ensur[ing] an adequate and reliable supply of [clean and abundant] natural gas at the lowest
reasonable price."5 Order No. 636 unraveled the regulated gas industry and in the words of
F.E.R.C. Chair Elizabeth Moler, "There is no going back."6 The restructuring of the natural
gas industry was greeted initially with angst and animosity; some given to hyperbole, cried
that Order No. 636 was a Pearl Harbor attack on the industry.
To achieve the regulators' vision, Order No. 636 required pipelines to separate
(unbundle) their sales and transportation services and to provide comparable transportation
services for
gas supplies, whether purchased from the pipeline or a third party. Open
access pipeline storage was required to be offered on a non-discriminatory basis and capacity
release programs were created to allow firm shippers to release their capacity temporarily or
permanently.
Order No. 636 transformed pipelines exclusively into transporters of natural gas. 7
Even though F.E.R.C. assured pipeline companies that Order No. 636 was not meant to force
them out of the merchant role, in reality, no major pipelines continued as merchants. In those
instances where the company remains a merchant, the sale of gas is usually handled by a
marketing affiliate or subsidiary of the company. The era of pipeline as merchant is defunct;
the era of pipeline as transporter has dawned.

all

• Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self Implementing Transportation; and
Regulations of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (April
16, 1992), ITI FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles P30,939 (April 8, 1992); order on reh'g, Order No.636-A, 57 Fed.
Reg. 36,128 (August 12, 1992), III FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles ?30,950 (August 3, 1992); order on reh'g, Order
No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (December 8, 1992), 61 FERC P61,272 (November 27, 1992), appeal pending sub
nom. Atlanta Gas Light Co., et ai. v. FERC, No. 92-8782, (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 1992).
s M· See also: Walker, Harold, Fortnightly, Paying The Piper, Vol. 132, No.8, April 1994 at p. 1; Order No.
636, Ill FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles at 30,391.
6

Moler, Elizabeth Anne, There is No Going Back, Fortnightly, October 1993, at 51.

7
In fact, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America's (TNGAA) annual pipeline survey "documents the
transition between the pre-636 era of bundled gas service and the unbundled post-636 world." The survey showed
pipeline sales dwindling to 10% of all 1993 gas volumes delivered, with the decreases in pipeline sales "balanced by
an increase in fum transportation, and to some extent, by the first released finn transportation flowing from the
capacity release market."
·
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Part 2. Deregulation Of Natura) Gas Pipelines
In response to the Order No. 636 mandate, the natural gas pipeline industry has
changed dramatically. Pipelines have unbl.Uldled sales from transportation services, and
opened interstate transportation capacity and pipeline storage capacity to access by any
qualified shipper on a firm or interruptible basis.8 Market hubs have developed; unique and
competitive pipeline services are being offered; natural gas is being traded as a commodity.

Pipeline Market Centers Or Market Hubs
The market center or market hub is defined as a "reliability center" where ''many
pipelines meet in a reasonably small geographic region."9 This concept has brought gas
marketing sophistication to the natural gas industry. Market hubs encourage market based
rates and increase post-636 competition by increasing reliability and trading opportunities; the
role of market hubs in the natural gas industry is described as follows:
[L)inked by electronic trading systems displaying near-real time market data ...
(market hubs] form a nationwide clearing house in which any seller across
North America would be able to offer supplies to the highest bidders, any
buyer could find a smorgasbord of gas supplies and select the source best suited
to his needs, and any shipper on equal footing with all other players could
obtain the services he needed to efficiently move purchased volumes to end
users.10
Because market hubs embody the regulatory vision of competition, F.E.RC. has
actively encouraged market centers by: (1) pro.bibiting rate design or tariff language which
frustrates market centers, (2) preferring fully unbl.Uldled services which has made market
centers easier to develop, and (3) creating a complementary capacity release market. 11

Order No. 636, HI FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles at 30,426. See 18 CFR 284.1(a).
9

FERC's OEP Director Richard O 'Neill Recommends Self-Regulation Of Regional Gas Market Hubs Operating
Within Geographical Limits, Foster Report, May 12, 1994, at 13 (hereinafter O'Neill).
10

/d. at 28.

11
!d. at 12. Not everyone would agree with this analysis ofF.E.R.C.'s supportive role: "F.E.R.C. failed to keep
its promise not to inhibit development of the centers. Production area hubs are a casualty of F.E.R.C.'s inability to
resolve ·- production area rate zone rates.... Production area rate hubs are eroding as market zone hubs proliferate."
Texas Conference Portrays Market Centers As The Standard For Natural Gas Transaction Business In The Future;
Participants Debate Definitions, F.E.R.C.'s Role, And Impact Of Competition, Foster Report, May 12, 1994 at 14
(hereinafter Texas Conference).

4

The proliferation of market centers is the first stage of an industry metamorphosis.
Currently there are more than forty 12 existing and proposed market centers located at "natural
pooling points" with multiple pipeline interconnections sitting midstream between major gas
supply and market areas on underutilized interstate gas transportation systems with
downstream sales capability and access to upstream supply areas. 13 It is doubtful that this
large number of market centers will continue. "Shakeout is imminent. Competitive pressures
are increasing. ... [T]he numbers will dwindle down to a handful." 14 With market centers or
market hubs appearing nationwide, competition will be especially fierce in the initial stages of
development. 15
,
Numerous pipelines have applied for and received authorization for market centers.
Each application is very individual, covering various geographical areas and offering
competitive services. 16
However, F.E.R.C. has rejected an enhanced hub application from Northern Illinois
Gas Co. and Southern California Gas Co. which would have extended their services to include
their capacity rights on other pipelines. F.E.R.C. rejected this off-system service stating that

11

Approximately one and one-half years ago, Coopers and Lybrand counted about fifteen existing and planned
market hubs. That number has burgeoned fiom fifteen to twenty-six to forty in a very short period of time! A.D.
Koen, U.S. Natural Gas Hubs Symbolize Order 636 Marketin!;! Evolution, Oil & Gas Journal, Sept. 5, 1994, at 27
[hereinafter U.S. Natural Gas Hubs].
13

/d., supra at 30.

14

!d.

u Already plans for one market hub have been dropped. On August 22, 1994, Mid-Louisiana withdrew its
proposal to reduce rates on a four mile lateral in order to encourage its use as a market hub. Compliance with the
conditions imPQsed by the F .E.R.C. would require additional expenditures; "given the speculative nature of the new
business estimated to be generated by its (market hub) proposal," Mid Louisiana withdrew its proposal. Mid
Louisiana Gas Co. "Order Accepting and Suspending Certain Tariff Sheets Subject to Refund a:td Conditions and
Rejecting Certain Tariff Sheets,• Docket No. RP94-322-000, 68 F.E.R.C. P61,229 (August 12, 1994). Mid Louisiana
Drops Plan To Use T-32 Lateral As Market Hub Due To Additional Costs Required To Comply With F.E.R.C.
Authorization, Foster Report, August 25, 1994, at 1.
16

The first pipeline to apply for hub services was National Fuel Gas Supply, requesting authorization for
parking, wheeling and imbalance resolution; F.E.R.C. granted this request on January 12, 1994 subject to the outcome
of a technical conference. National fuel Gas Supply Corp. ~order Accepting and Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject
to Refund and Conditions, Rejecting Other Tariff Sheets, and Establishing a Technica.l Conference; Docket No.
RP94-80, 66 F.E.R.C. P61,031 (January 12, 1994). See also Pacific Gas Transmission Company, Docket No. RP94145, "Order Acce pting and Suspending Tariff Sheets Subject to Refund, and Establishing a Technical Conference," 66 .
F.E.R.C. P61,356 (March 25, 1994); CNG Transmission Corporation, Docket Nos. RP94-213-000, et al., "Order
Accepting and Suspending Tariff Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions, And Consolidating Proceedings; 67
F.E.R.C. 61,349 (June 20, 1994); Southern California Gas Company, "Order Extending Time For Action; Docket
No. RP94-16, 69 F.E.R.C. P61,097 (October 27, 1994); CMS Gas Transmission and Storage Co.. Tejas Power Corp.,
St. Clair Pipelines, and Enron Gas Services Com. - Grands Lacs Market Center, Foster Report, April 21, 1994, at 30;
K N rnterstate Gas Transmission Co., Docket Nos. RP95-35·000, et al., ."Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff
Sheets, Subject To Refund And Gond.itions" (December 2, 1994); Tejas Power Partners With Four Corporations To
Form Market Hub Chain, Foster Report, January 5, 1995, at 28.

5

the application violated the shipper-must-have-title rule, evaded capacity release procedures,
and was a return to now illegal buy/sell transactions. 17
Market hubs are evolving into natural gas "supermarkets" where gas services are
increasingly bought and sold and will be integrally related to short-term markets. Market
hubs will become the primary pricing points for the industry and may supplant utilities'
formal monthly spot gas bidding programs. When fully implemented, real time metering will
boost the demand for hub services. In addition, a two-tier hub structure will emerge: primary
hub points in major production/market areas and regional or satellite hubs in secondary
production/market areas. 18

New Pipeline Market Centers Or Market Hub Services
In order to be successful, the hub or market center must offer flexible buying and
selling, the availability of long term contracting and hourly trading, uniform electronic
markets, futures trading and capacity release transactions. 19 "Hub operators are expected to
offer unique services to users, services such as wheeling, ... title transfer, displacement
delivery, parking, inverse parking and imbalance penalty management .... Hub operators will
be the future market-makers, featuring full service menus."20
While the definitions of these services may vary from pipeline to pipeline, the
following are the most commonly held definitions for the new hub services which are offered:
Parking - delivery of gas into the hub and "parking" or short-term storage at
the hub for a very short term -(one or more days);
Parked Quantity Delivery - transportation of parked quantities of gas from the
parking point to an identified delivery point;
Loaning - removal of gas from the hub and its return one or more days later;
Wheeling - simultaneous receipt of gas into the hub and delivery of gas out of
the hub through displacement or exchanges at different receipt and delivery
locations;
Pooling - aggregation of gas· at the pool;
Authorized Imbalance - hub operator (transporter) will advance gas to shippers
who will return the volumes to the hub operator at a later date or upon notice
from the operator.
Electronic Trading Systems - Another hub service which is becoming more widely
used are electronic trading systems.

17

Northern Illinois Gas Co. and Southern California Gas Co., "Order On Petition For Rate Approval And Order
Amending Statement Of Operating Conditions," Docket No. CP92-481·000, et al., 70 F.E.R.C. P61,099 (January 30,
1995); Rejecting Hub Plans Could Hurt Efficiency, Gas Daily, March 3, 1995, at 1; F.E.R.C. Rules That Hub
Providers May Not Extend Services Beyond Their Own Facilities, Foster Report, February 2, 1995, at 4.
11
Growing Role Of Storaee Projects And Market Centers Predicted For California Gas Markets, Foster Report,
July 28, 1994, at 19.
19

O'Neill, supra note 9, at 13.

~ Pipe Line Industry, Vol. 77, No. 1, January, 1994, at 13.
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With an electronic market hub trading network, traders can track gas price differentials among
all the hubs and buy gas daily in a transaction-intensive manner at any hub linked to the net.
In time, large regional hubs will be tied together by a unified electronic trading network; a
master hub electronic trading system is in the future. Many believe that including all large
regional hubs on the network will lower gas costs volumetrically.21
Uniformity At Market Centers
Uniformity and flexibility are key words integral to the success of market hubs. 22 To
facilitate the use of market centers, uniform tariff language must be developed for industry
terms, such as: gas day,23 nomination deadlines, daily balancing/4 electronic bulletin
boards, real time measurement and flow control, data interchange and environmental
monitoring.25
Although F.E.R.C. is concerned with uniformity of standards at market centers, it has
not attempted to "regulate" uniformity. Commissioner Santa wondered if F.E.RC. "should
initiate proceedings to change rates, terms and conditions believed to discourage hubs,
scrutinize pipeline rate design with respect to its effect on market centers, or insist on greater
uniformity of pipeline business practices and standards?'' Santa also considered applying the
regional transmission group (RTG) electric concept to the gas industry: F.E.R.C. would
accept the hub group's tariff filings setting out rules for doing business at a hub. "This would
achieve consistency in the operation of the multiple pipelines that access· a bub without the
need for heavy handed regulatory intervention."26
21

"The electronic data interchange could provide arbitrage opportunities on a national basis so shippers could
wheel gas to various parts of the country.•. And if we could include main hubs in Canada and the border crossing
points between the U.S. and Mexico, maybe we could start creating our vision of what an international electronic hub
trading system ought to provide in terms of information and services." U.S. Natural Gas Hubs, supra note 12, at 32.
n Interstate Natural Gas Association task force has recommended steps to assist integration of the deregulated
natural gas industry. INGAA Details Ways To Improve Gas Grid Integration. Oil & Gas Journal, March 20, 1995, at
122.
23 Gas day is typicany defined in a pipeline's tariff as a period of twenty-four consecutive hours beginning and
ending at 8:00 a.m., unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.

:u If a balance of receipts and deliveries is not maintained, Seller may impose one or more imbalance charges as
described in the pipeline tariff.
2
' F.E.R.C. Order No. 563 "Standards for Electronic Bulletin Boards Required Under Part 284 of the
Commission's Regulations," Docket No. RM93-4, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. P30,988 (December 23, 1993), set
standards for the operation of electronic bulletin boards. Electronic Data Interchange (ED!) and other
communications standards will "foster arbitrage" between hubs, and make EBBs more customer friendly. The Gas
Industry Standards Board (GISB} will also foster uniformity and standardization within the industry. Texas
Conference, supra note 11, at 16.

16 Commissioner Santa Discusses What's Ahead For F.E.R.C.. Both Near Term And Long Term, Foster Report,
July 21, 1994, at 1. F.E.R.C. has received at least one filing requesting that it address the crea1ion of market centers,
contending that "de facto development of a market center policy is not enough." The City of Hamilton. Ohio has
requested that F.E.R.C. designate Lebanon, Ohio as a market center and require the five interconnecting pipelines

7

According to F.E.R.C. Office of Economic Policy Director Richard O'Neill,
F.E.R.C.'s policy is to "let the market develop the market centers."27 However, neither
Commissioner Santa nor O'Neill closed the door on F.E.R.C. intervention.28

New Pipeline Transportation Services
In addition to the exotic new services offered at market centers or hubs, pipelines are
competing for customers by revising their current tariffs to allow greater flexibility for firm
and interruptible transportation 29 Such services as hourly scheduling flexibility, paper-

(ANR Pipeline Co., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., CNG Transmission Corp., Texas Eastern Transmission Corp.,
and Texas Gas Transmission Corp.) to modifY their tariffs to remove any impediments to the development of Lebanon
as a market center. City of Hamilton Seeks Policy Statement Designating Lebanon. Ohio As Gas Market Center As
One Step Toward 'More Proactive' F.E.R.C. Role, Foster Report, May 26, 1994, at 30.
21

O'Neill, supra note 9, at 12

11
The GAO Report "Natural Gas Regulation: Little Opposition to F.E.R.C.'s Recent Policies On Transportation·
Related Services" (GAOIRCED-95-39) concludes that it is too early to detennine what F.E.R.C.'s regulatory role
should be, if any. GAO Reports Relatively Little Or No Industry Opposition To Recent F.E.R.C. Regulatory Policies
Regarding Pipeline Gathering Affiliates. Market-Based Storaee Rates and Market Hubs, Foster Report, January 12,
1995, at 33.
2'1 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company filed tariff sheets last year to provide new hourly scheduling flexibility
service for interruptible transportation. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, "Order Aceepting Tariff Sheets Subject To
Conditions," Docket No. RP94·187.000, 67 F.E.R.C. P61,316, (June 14, 1994). The new hourly scheduling
flexibility for interruptible transportation service allows a shipper to change its nominations with 60 minutes prior
notice at any time of the day to reflect changes in·quantities to be delivered under the transportation contract related
to qualified receipt and delivery points. This new service will meet the needs of electric generator customers who
need short notice transportation service to meet their fluctuating peak load. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. has
implemented ten paper pooling points which will allow customers to purchase gas at receipt points and bring the gas
to a pool without being charged a transportation rate, except for gathering charges if applicable. Koch Gateway
Pipeline Co., "Order On Third Compliance Filing And Granting And Denying Request For Rehearing; Docket No.
RS 92-26·007, et al., 65 F.E.R.C. P61,338 (December 16, 1993). See also Koch Gateway Proposes To Establish
Pooling Service, Foster Report, April 14, 1994, at 21. Koch's paper pooling points apply transportation charges to the
movement of gas from the pool to a delivery point on an interruptible basis. A firm shipper with a primary receipt
point in a specific pooling area could assign primary receipt point capacity within pooling areas to a pooling customer
supplying it gas at the pooling points. The pooling customer could then use that capacity to serve the finn customer's
transportation needs. Questar Pipeline Co. fUed revised tariff sheets to implement a new Receipt Point Group (RPG)
service concept which provides additional flexibility to finn transportation customers by allowing customers who bold
firm primary capacity to nominate all or any portion of that capacity to any other available receipt point within the
RPG; F.E.R.C. adopted this proposal. Questar Pipeline Company, "Letter Order,• Docket Nos. RP94-21Q.OOO, et al.,
67 F.E.R.C. P61,218 (May 20, 1994). See also Questar Proposes New Service Providing Firm Shippers Greater
Flexibility To Nominate Alternate Receipt Points In Same Area, Foster Report, April 28, 1994, at 19. Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp. proposed to implement tariff sheets providing "enhanced transportation rights• to its customers in
its market zones, allowing customers to deliver gas in one market zone without limiting the customer's capacity rights
in a downstream market zone. F.E.R.C. accepted this "enhanced transportation" proposal subject to refund and·a
technical conference. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, "Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff Sheets,
Subject To Refund And Conditions, And Establishing A Technical Conference; Docket No. RP94·357-000, 68
F.E.R.C. P61,385, (September 29, 1994).
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pooling points, and enhanced transportation rights are being introduced to expand pipeline
transportation services.

Pipeline Capacity Release
To increase transportation volumes, F.E.R.C. envisioned a robust secondary
transportation market engineered by its capacity release program. Under Order No. 636,
capacity release allowed customers who hold contracts for firm pipeline capacity to release it
(either temporarily or permanently) for use by other parties. The customer's ability to release
tmused capacity would "minimize the net cost of flilll transmission capacity to their ratepayers
. . . . The capacity-related revenues generated by such transactions are then credited against the
bills rendered to the original capacity holder under the pipeline~ s contract."30
What F.E.RC. expected and what F.E.RC. is getting are proving to be two different
things. All agree that increased capacity release transactions will affect market hub
operations; however, there is minimal reliance on capacity release among pipelines and. most
local distribution companies and there are more short term capacity release transactions than
long term ones.31
In particular, these capacity release issues must be addressed: "(1) the requirement to
post releases in excess of 30 days (or one month less one day ...);31 (2) the requirement that
the shippers. have title to the gas ... ; (3) the current price cap (the pipeline's maximum firm

~ Gas Capacity Release: Opportunity or Pitfall? Fortnightly, December 1, 1993, at p. 3.
31
Relying on a study performed by Hadson Gas Systems, the following information was uncovered about
capacity release: 1) 6 percent of the total natural gas volumes transported over the past six months have been moved
through released capacity; 2) four pipelines (EI Paso Natural Gas Co., Pacific Gas Transmission Co., Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America) have accounted for 55 percent of the capacity released; 3)
most capacity releases are prearranged for a short term; 4) a •gray market• has developed which involves transactions
that make use of regulated firm transportation rebundled with unregulated sales of gas to serve markets that otherwise
would rely on either interruptible or released fum transportation service; 5) there is a lack of participation in capacity
release transactions by many large LDCs; 6) affiliate related capacity releases play a relatively .minor role, amounting
to less than 5 percent of the national total volume released; and 7) pipelines• discounted fT service has directly
competed with capacity released to the same markets by their LDC customers. The Hadson study is entitled: The
Rumble of Bundles: A Review of Experience Under the Capacity Release Experiment. Hadson Executive Analvzes
Capacity Release Programs In The Interstate Gas Market, Foster Report, September ,1, 1994, at 1 - 4; Capacity
Release Yields Bargains. But Business Isn' t Brisk Everywhere, Inside F.E.R.C., August 29, 1994, at 1- 3; Order No.
636 Capacity Release Program Gets Critical Airing At Gas lndustrv Conference, Foster Report, September 8, 1994, at
2 [hereinafter Order No. 636 Capacity Release].
·

u Initially, F.E.R.C. refused to alter the definition of a short term prearranged capacity release of one month or
less when it denied Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America's request. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, "Order
Accepting Certain Tariff Sheets, Subject to Conditions, And Rejecting Other Tariff Sheets," Docket No. RP94-255·
000, 67 F.E.R.C. P6I,385 (June 23, 1994). Chair Moler stated that the industry should continue to "play the release
game before we change the rules." Moler Suggests That Less Regulation May Be The Best For Gas Market, Inside
F.E.R.C., September 12, 1994, at 11.

9

transportation (FT) rate);" 33 (4) pipelines' ability to acquire available transportation and
storage capacity on other pipelines.34
Disappointed with the lack of enthusiasm for capacity release, F.E.R.C. agreed to
review the Order No. 636 capacity release mechanism by issuing a list of question~5 and by
inviting a number of gas industry members to informal discussions on the topic. 36 On
January 12, 1995, F.E.R.C. issued a proposed rulemaking that alters the short term
prearranged capacity release to thirty days, ending the large·number of release transactions
which involved the pairing of a twenty-nine day prearranged release with a one day deal with
the same terms to avoid the bidding process.37 This is the· first substantive change to the
capacity release rules outlined in Order No. 636. F.E.R.C. is continuing to consider removing
the price cap set at the pipeline's maximum FT rate.
·

13

Order No. 636 Capacity Release, supra note 31, at 3. The F.E.R.C. refused to alter the definition of a short
term prearranged capacity release to one month or Jess when it deni:ed Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America's request
in Docket No. RP94-25S. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, "Order Accepting Certain Tariff Sheets, Subject to
Conditions, and Rejecting Other Tariff Sheets," Docket No. RP94-255·000, 67 F.E.R.C. P61,385 (June 23, 1994).
'However this position was changed in Order No. 577 and Order No. 577-A. See note 37 infra.
" Pipeline Seeks Uniformity On Capacity Riehts, Gas Daily, March 6, 1995, at I.
1

' Among the fourteen Capacity Release Outreach Questions, tbe following were asked: "What are the strengths
and weaknesses of the program? What needs to be changed? Has the lack of uniform operational rules on different
pipelines hindered capacity release transactions involving multiple pipelines? Are price caps on released capacity
necessary? Has the .Jack of uniform operational rules on different pipelines hindered release transactions involving
multiple pipelines? Is there a perception that prearranged deals are preferable over bidding? What would be the
effect of permitting the sale of capacity directly between shippers without posting and bidding? Why are buy/sell, ·
and bundled capacity/gas transactions, the so-called 'gray market,' being used as an alternative to the capacity release
program?" Staff Solicits Industry Views on Workings Of Capacity-Release Program, Inside F.E.R.C., October 3,
1994, at 12- 13. F.E.R.C. Staff To Hold Information Meetings With Industry Groups To Find Out How Capacity
Release Program Is Working Prior To Scheduling Public Conference, Foster Report, October 6, 1994, at 9.

u These informal meetings occurred in October and November, 1994. !NOAA suggested that the revenue
crediting requirement for Interruptible Transportation (IT) volumes be eliminated; that calendar-month prearranged
deals be allowed; that the complaint procedure should be used by F. E.R.C. to address Electronic Bulletin Board
(EBB) posting issues; and that pipeline affiliates should be treated no differently than other marketers who participate
in the secondary market. "Recommendation of the Rate & Policy Analysis Committees on the Capacity Release
Market," INGAA White Paper, October 12, 1994.
" Release Of Firm Capacity On Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, "Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking," Docket No.
RM95·5·000, 70 F.E.R.C. P61,019 (January 12, 1995); F.E.R.C. Proposes Capacitv Release Changes, Energy Daily,
January 13, 1995, at 4; Industry Responds to Capacity Release Change, Gas Daily, February 24, 1995, at 2; F.E.R.C.
Issues Notice Of Proposed Rule To Make Prearranged One Month Capacity Releases Exempt From Posting And
Bidding Requirements, Foster Report, January 12, 1995, at I. F.E.R.C. issued Order No. 577 making this change to
capacity release. Order No. 577, 70 F.E.R.C. P61,359 (March 29, 1995); Order No. 577-A, Ordering Granting
Rehearing, 71 F.E.R.C. P61,254 (May 31, 1995).

10

New Pipeline Storage Services
To enhance competition, Order No. 636 unbundled pipeline storage capacity allowing
access by any qualified shipper on a fum or interruptible basis.38 Many independent
pipelines and "storage" marketers are assessing available storage and are considering installing
or expanding seasonal and peaking gas storage facilities in supply and market areas.39 With
storage now playing a vital role in the supply chain, it is entirely possible that "storage
capacity could become a commodity as valuable as gas. "40
While F.E.RC. has not directly addressed the interplay between market centers and
storage, numerous efforts have been made to link the two through hub agreements. Like
hubs, storage facilities can provide balancing services, short-term inventory balancing,
incremental supplies and demand, and operational flexibility for shippers. "It is arguable that
these hub services are rebundled storage services.... "41
F.E.R.C. has authorized market-based rates for storage services.42 The first market
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Order No. 636, III F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. Preambles at 30,426; see 18 CFR 284.1(a). Since Order No. 636
allowed pipelines to retain only enough storage and transportation capacity to maintain operational control of the
interstate transportation system and to provide no-notice service, access to storage is now available to producers and
end users. Indeed, the American Gas Association states that more than "3 tcf of working gas will be in storage for
the coming winter peak demand periods* and that "[s}toragc withdrawals this winter are expected to account for about
S% of U.S. interstate gas pipeline non-peak month throughput, ftrm transportation volumes 71%, interruptible
transportation 17%, and no-notice and pipeline system gas the balance." F.E.R.C. Order 636 Spawns Flurry Of U.S.
Gas Storage Projects, Oil & Gas Journal, October 1993, at 26.
9
'
Historically, storage was built for seasonal use under a rate based system; a "one size fits all" seasonal storage
facility which some believe is overbuilt in the market area but high deliverability storage is under built in both the
market and producing areas. Pipeline Industry, Vol. 77, No. 2, February 1994, at 36. High deliverability storage
such as salt dome storage •• currently a small percentage of total storage capacity -- will increase significantly as it
can cycle completely up to ten times a year. Foster Report, February 1994, at 30.
40
F.E.R.C . Order 636 Spawns Flurry Of U.S. Gas Storage Projects, Oil & Gas Journal, October, 1993, supra
note 38, at 21.

•• Texas Conference Portrays Market Centers As The Standard For Natural Gas Transaction Business In The
Future; Participants Debate Definitions. F.E.R.C.'s Role. And rmpact Of Competition, Foster Report, May 12, 1994,
at 14. One such example is the proposed Alberta Energy Partnership storage and market center project. Development
of this 2,500 acre $5 million project would "provide an independent gas storage alternative for California non-core
customers who traditionally have had to rely on the storage services of the state's two major public utilities.... A
number of other HUB and market center services would be offered to satisi)r the requirements of the California gas
marketplace." Alberta Energy Partnership Explorine Kern County, California Gas Storage Project And Market
Center, Foster Report, March 31 , 1994, at 30.
42 Among these are Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. out of its Bistineau Storage Facility in Webster Parish; Louisiana
(42.5 Bcf); Bay Gas Storage Co. Ltd. in association with a new salt dome storage cavern being constructed jointly
with Olin Corp. in Washington County, Alabama {I .S Bcf); Richfield Gas Storage System from underground storage
in Morton County, Kansas (3.5 Bcf}; Petal Gas Storage Co. in Mississippi(1.6 Bcf); and Transok, Inc. (4.0 Bcf)
F.E.R.C. Grants Preliminary Approval Of Avoca's Market-Based Storage Services In Consumption Area Based On
Extensive Evaluation Of Competitive Conventional Storage And LNG Alternatives, Foster Report, June 30, 1994, at
4. F.E.R.C. Approves Koch Gateway's Request To Charee Negotiated Rates For Unbundled Storage Service, Foster
Report, March 31, 1994, at 6. Recently an intrastate pipeline, Llano Inc.'s market based transmission and storage
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area storage project to seek and obtain approval of negotiated rates was Avoca Natural Gas
Storage. F.E.R.C. detennined that:
(1) a salt dome storage facility would be in the public convenience and
necessity; (2) Avoca can provide peak period supply, balancing and gas price
arbitrage in competition with similar services already provided by conventional
and LNG storage in the area; and (3) Avoca will be unable to exercise market
power because it is small relative to the alternatives available to customers,
because market concentration for short-term peak supply services is low, and
because other factors temper Avoca's ability to exercise power where market
concentration for other services is high."43
Several applications for market based storage rates have run aground at the F.E.R.C.
absent evidence of lack of market power. Neither Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. nor Cove
44
Point LNG Limited Partnership were successful in their bid for market-based storage rates.
Not all certificate applications for storage facilities request market based rates. Young Gas
Storage Co. Ltd's application to develop and operate a natural gas storage field at cost-based
rates was approved. 4s

rates were approved by F.E.R.C. Intrastate Seeks Market-Based Rates For Storage And Transportation. Inside
F.E.R.C., October 17, 1994, at II.
41

F.E.R.C. Grants Preliminary Approval. supra note 42, at 4. Avoca Natural Gas Storage, "Preliminary
Determination On Non-Environmental Issues," 68 F.E.R.C. P61,045, (July 8, 1994); Avoca Natural Gas Storage,
*Order Issuing Certificates," 68 F.E.R.C. P61,333, (September 20, 1994). For additional market-based storage
applications, see Ouachita River Gas Storage Co.'s application to construct and operate an underground storage
facility at market based rates. Ouachita River Gas Storage Company, L.L.C., "Preliminary Determination On
Nonenvironmental Issues,'' Docket No. CP94-38-000, 68 F.E.R.C. P61,402, (September 30, 1994); and Koch Gateway
Pipeline Company's application to charge market based rates for production area unbundled storage service. The
Koch application was embraced enthusiastically by the F.E.R.C. Commissioners "generally agreeing that the Koch
Gateway's market power analysis could serve as a model for other entities seeking to implement negotiated rates."
F.E.R.C. Approves Koch Gateway' s Request To Charge Negotiated Rates For Unbundled Storage Services, supra
note 42, at 6; Koch Gateway Pipeline Company, "Order On Market-Based Contract Storage Rates," 66 F.E.R.C.
?61,385 (March 31, 1994).
44
Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, "Order Granting In Part Approval Of Rate Petition," 68 F.E.R.C.
P61,090, (July 19, 1994). See also F,E.R.C. Grants MichCon's Request To Charge State-Approved Rates For
Transportation Service. But Denies Market-Based Rate For Storage Service, Foster Report, July 14, 1994, at 11. Cove
Point LNG Limited Partnership, "Order Denying Price Cap Proposal, Denying Rehearing, Granting Clarification,
Authorizing Abandonments, And Issuing Certificates," Docket Nos. CP94-59-000, et al. 68 F.E.R.C. P61,377,
(September 28, 1994); "Order Denying Reconsideration,'' 69 F.E.R.C. P61,292 (December 5, 1994). See also
F.E.R.C. Approves Recommissioning Of Cove Point LNG Facilities But Nixes Market-Based Rates Absent Evidence
Of Lack Of Market Power, Foster Report, July 28, 1994, at 9.

Young Gas Storage Company, Ltd., "Order Issuing Certificates And Granting And Denying Rehearing,~ 66
F.E.R.C. P61,280 (1994). F.E.R.C. Issues Certificate For Young Gas Stora2e Project In Colorado; Increases
Authorized Eauitv Return On Rehearing From 12.25 Percent To 12.75 Percent, Foster Report, June 16, 1994, at 23.
41
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Recognition of the important role storage will play has encouraged numerous pipelines
to consider adding storage projects to their future plans. Both Southern California Gas Co.
and Pacific Gas & Electric Co. have proposed unbundled storage programs in California for
non-core customers. The storage program will offer load balancing, basic long tenn contract,
short term and off-season storage services. Alberta Energy Partnership is considering
development and operation of the Ten Section Hub. The project would be located near all
five California pipelihe systems and serve as a market center for the western regions of the
U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 46
Storage has become a vital part of the gas supply chain; a menu of storage services has
been included as part of pipelines', producers', marketers' and aggregators' portfolios.
Local distribution companies and large industrial customers will buy storage in order to
manage their own portfolios of gas supplies. In the future, storage will be traded
electronically and will become part of the futures market
Pipeline Rate Zones, Cost·Based Rates, Market-Based Rates
A number of pipelines have found that a complex multi-tiered rate structure binders
the ability to compete at the market centers; pipelines are filing revised tariff sheets to
simplify their rate structure.47 Once the gas arrives at the market center, the shipper reviews
the pipeline capacity available and selects the most competitive rate. F.E.R.C.'s Economic
Policy Director O'Neill believes that rate zone bolUldaries will develop at and around the
market centers - so called "concentric rate zones."43
Another issue which has been raised by applications for market hub rates or storage
service rates at F.E.RC. is the authorization of market based or cost-based rates. Although
F.E.RC. generally authori.zes rates based on the cost of service, F.E.RC. "is not required to
adhere rigidly to a cost-based determination of rates"49 and has flexibility in selecting a
ratemaking methodology.~ F.E.R.C. may consider rates reached as a result of competition

• 6 Growing Role Of Storage Projects And Market Centers Predicted For Califomia Gas Markets, Foster Report,
July 28, 1994, at 18; Alberta Energy Partnership Exploring Kem County, Califomia Gas Storage Project And Market
Center, Foster Report, March 31, 1994, at 30.
7
•
For example, NorAm Gas Transmission Company filed tariff sheets to change from its current complexity of
postage stamp transportation rates to three additive rate zones on NorAm's throughway system and to establish a ·
market lateral surcharge designed to recover the costs of such facilities only from those customers who use them.
NorAm Gas Transmission Company, "Order Accepting And Suspending Tariff Sheets Subject To Refund And
Conditions, And Establishing A Technical Conference And Hearing Procedures,• Docket Nos. RP94-343-000, et al.
68 F.E.R.C. P61, 272 (August 31, 1994).

•• O'Neill, supra note 9, at 12. An example of these rate zone boundaries or concentric rate zones was applied
by National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. at Ellisburg-Leidy.
• 9 Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 734 F.2d 1486, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1984), quoting F.E.R.C. v.
Pennzoil Production Company, 439 U.S. 508, 517 (1979) [hereinafter Farmers Union).

,., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1968).
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where it can "demonstrate that market forces could be relied upon to keep prices at reasonable
levels. nSI
.
However, F.E.R.C. has exhibited a reluctance to approve market based rates for
transportation. K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co. applied for market-based rates for its
Buffalo Wallow market hub. If granted by F.E.R.C., this application would have been the
first time market-based rates for transp-ortation services would have been approved. Instead,
F.E.R.C. rejected the proposed market-based transportation tariff sheets stating that K N had
not shown that it Jacked significant market power. 52 When K N Interstate Gas Transmission
Co. reapplied for cost-based transportation rates, F.E.RC. ·granted this revised application.53
F.E.R.C. also denied Ouachita River Gas Storage Co.'s request to provide interruptible
hub services at market-based rates since Ouachita had not demonstrated a sufficient lack of
market power. F.E.RC. grappled with ''how its framework for analysis of market power
might apply to an application for market-based rates for hub services"54 and decided that the
company must show that "sufficient good alternatives to its proposed services are available in
sufficient quantity to prevent Ouachita River from exercising market power."55
F.E.R.C. continues to be uncomfortable with market-based transportation rates;
however, F.E.R.C. did ask the industry for comments on achieving non traditional, marketbased and incentive rates. 56 It is unclear what evidence F.E.R.C. will accept as conclusively
proving Jack of market power. Uneasy with untying the regulators' hands by approving
market-based transportation rates, F.E.R.C. is now encouraging incentive rate plans.

'

1

Farmers Union. supra note 49, at 1510.

2

F.E.R.C. expressed concern that extensive business arrangements with affiliates and the existence of captive
customers did not lend itself to light-handed regulation. F .E.R.C. stated that K N had not documented the effect the
non jurisdictional services (title transfers, electronic trading) would have on jurisdictional services and that requiring
daily balancing and a daily variance charge contradicted the need for additional flexibiliry in negotiating terms and
conditions with prospective shippers. K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co., "Order Rejecting Tariff Sheets And
Providing For Further Procedures," Docket No. RP94-328-000, 68 F.E.R.C. P61,401 (September 30, 1994).
'

n K N Interstate Gas Transmission Co., Docket Nos. RP95-35-000, et al. "Order Accepting And Suspending
Tariff Sheets, Subject To Refund And Conditions," 69 F.E.R.C. P61, 287 (December 2, 1994).
,. Commission Says No To Market Based Rates For Associated Interruptible Hub Service, Foster Report,
October 6, 1994, at 3.
ss Commissioner Santa mused, "What if Ouachita River demonstrated good alternatives for SO of the 72
interconnect paths but then offered rate caps or some other means to mitigate its market power with respect to the
interconnect paths for which there was no good alternative?" F.E.R.C. Has Mixed FeelinstS About Planned Ouachita
River Storaee Project, Inside F.E.R.C., October 10, 1994, at 15.

u Alternatives To Traditional Cost.Of-Service Ratemaking For Natural Gas Pipelines, "Request For Comments
And Alternative Pricing Methods: Docket No. RM95-6-000, 70 F.E.R.C. P61,139 (February 8, 1995); "Market-based
rates for pipelines may result in a barrage of litigation before the pipelines finally lose the battle ... market analysis for
pipelines would be extremely complex and costly and would likely result in findings of significant market power for
most pipeline markets." Utilities Warn F.E.R.C. To Go Easy With Market Rates, Gas Daily, March I, 1995, at 3.
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In conclusion, the era of pipeline exclusively as transporter has dawned. And along ·
with this new role, has come the creation of market hubs offering flexible buying and selling,
the availability of long term contracting and J:iourJy trading, uniform electronic markets,
futures trading and capacity release transactions. Unique pipeline transportation services have
appeared.
F.E.R.C.'s vision of replicating wellhead competition and introducing competition into
the pipeline segment of the natural gas industry is complete. But how will the benefits of
competition reach the consumer? Currently small gas producers, many local distribution
companies and small end users are not directly using market hubs since they lack firm
transportation capacity and do not ship large volumes of gas on hub facilities.s 7 Even
though F.E.R.C. has no jurisdictional control over local distribution companies, it is
reasonable to assume that the various state commissions will use F.E.R.C. deregulation of the
pipeline industry as a template to deregulate the gas industry at the local level.

Part 3. Deregulation of the Local Distribution Company
Natural gas pipeline deregulation has dramatically impacted state commissions and the
local distribution companies (LDCs) they regulate.ss In time, LDCs will mimic deregulated
pipelines and terminate or severely curtail their historic gas sales service,S9 offering
unbundled transportation, storage, capacity release, administrative and financial services.
Repercussions from the deregulation of the pipeline industry have altered completely
the LDC's sales service. Competition is appearing at the local level. And with this
competition, the LDC will face more risk, more responsibility for gas supply, variable costs of
gas transportation and storage, threat of pipeline bypass, and Joss of large loads.60 To be

51

U.S. Natural Gas Hubs. supra note 12, at 30.

sa "Order No. 636 pulled the bundled merchant service 'safety net' out from under local distribution companies.
Now responsibilities are shifting from the pipelines to the LDCs, who must manage their interstate pipeline capacity
and the markets behind their city gates," according to F.E.R.C. Commissioner Santa. Sania: LDCs Turn ing Leaner
And Meaner·Under 636, Gas Daily, February 28, 1995, at 2.
59
Historically, most LDCs offered only three types of service: residential, firm non residential, and interruptible
gas sales service. Except during supply shortages in the 1970s, LDCs did not offer customers the option of
transportation, balancing, and storage service for customer-owned gas. Moreover, rates for firm and interruptible sales
service to industrial customers were set above cost of service, causing industrial custom ers to subsidize residential
service. . This was justified on the basis that industrial customers placed a higher value on the gas. Until rece.ntly, this
price discrimination between rate classes and bundling of sales with transportation service continued with linle
complaint from industrial customers because federal authorities kept LDC wholesale gas costs-the bulk of LDC total
costs-at low levels compared to alternate fuels. Louis Monacell, Unbundling Natural Gas Service: Lessons F.rom
Virginia, Fortnightly, May 11, 1989, at 9 [hereinafter Monacell].

60 Competition will jeopardize the industrial load which has historically subsidized the LDC residential forcing
prices to increase dramatically to the residential core customer. Order 636 May Add 34 Cents Per Mcf To Residential
Consumers' Bills from 1993 through 1995 according to the Energy Information Administration in the recent article in
lnside F.E.R.C., February 28, 1994, at 13.
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successful, the LDC now must face the challenge of deregulation and expand beyond its
historic sales service role. The LDC must add new services, marketing affiliates, gas
procurement and management, pipeline hubs, storage projects, capacity release, transportation,
curtailment, and pooling of resources to its current portfolio of'services.61

Increased Oversight Role of State Commissions
Now that the LDC "can assemble a portfolio of gas supplies, flnn transportation, and
storage arrangements which are tailored to their individual needs rather than purchasing a 'one
size fits all' bundled service package from their pipeline supplier, the LDCs [can] reduce their
costs by purchasing only services they need and [so exercise] ... control over [their]
destiny."62 However, with this increased LDC control comes increased LDC responsibility
and risk. Indeed, F.E.R.C. 's lessening of control over pipelines at the federal level has
increased regulatory oversight at the local level. The increased oversight role of the state
commissions began once the pipelines unbundled, with some state cornmi~ions angered by
the abdication of F.E.R.C!s regulatory role and the resulting increased responsibility at the
local level.63
Issues which were addressed by F.E.R.C. reappear at the state level: competition,
partial or complete deregulation, market-based rates, market affiliates, incentive plans,
unbundling, and new services.64 Chief among state commission concerns is the fear that
deregulation will result in poorer services and higher rates for the consumer.65 In an attempt

61

Stephen Huntoon, 636 to the Bumertip? Fortnightly, July I, 1994, at 22 (hereinafter Huntoon].

6

Pipeline Industry, Vol. 77, No. l, January 1994, at 13.

l

" A number of state commissions and associations have filed a joint brief requesting that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reverse and remand Order No. 636, et al. Among other issues, the
petitioners state that SFV rate design eliminated pipeline incentives for productive efficiency and attack the position
that MFV rate design is unjust and unreasonable; petitioners contend that F.E.R.C . should have mitigated GSR costs
through the abrogation or moditicatjon of jurisdictional contracts or disallowance of some portion of gas supply
realignment (GSR) cost recovery from CO!l$umers; petitioners also claim that the F.E.R.C. failed to provide a reasoned
explanation for preempting state commission jurisdiction over the assignment by LDCs of their capacity entitlements
on interstate pipelines. United Distribution Companies, et al. v. Federal Energy Regulatorv Commission. Joint Brief
For Petitioners: Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Public Utilities Commission Of The State Of California,
Illinois Commerce Commission, State Of Indiana, Office Of Utility Consumer Counselor, Iowa Utilities Board, Public
Service Commission of the Commonwealth Of Kentucky, Maryland Office Of People's Counsel, Missouri Public
Service Commission, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Public Service Commission of the State of New York,
Ohio Office Of the Coll$umers' Counsel, Pennsylvania Office Of Consumer Advocate, Public Service Commission Of
West Virginia, Consumer Advocate Division, Public Service Commission Of Wisconsin, The National Association Of
State Utility Consumer Advocates, And The National Association Of Regulatory Utility Commissioners; United States
Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit, Nos. 92-1485, et al., March 14, 1995.
'"' Pipeline Industry, Vol. 77, No. 2, February, 1994, at 35.
5
'
State commissions must now embark pn a thorough analysis of the need for LDC regulatory reform to allow
"more reliable, flexible, efficient and customer service (oriented LDCs)." Foster Report, No. 1967, February 24,
1994, at 16.
·
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to alleviate this concern, state commissions immediately began by participating at the F.E.R.C.
level "to try to mitigate cost shifting to core distribution customers."66

State Commissions Review Gas Purchasing Practices
State commissions fear that the LDC core customers67 will pay the costs for
unbundling. The LDC "will still be the sole supplier for bundled gas and will continue to be
subject to state public utility regulation. The size of the core market is expected to shrink as
Straight Fixed Variable (SFV) transportation rate and full passthrough of transition costs make
core distribution service more expensive. "68 Sophisticated noncore customers will leave the
· LDC, and contract individually for gas supply, bypass, or use alternate fuels to supplement
their gas load. Noncore customers will use LDC facilities to transport gas only.
Since the LDC is no longer tied to the pipeline for gas supplies, for the ftrst time the
LDC is strictly accountable for their gas purchasing policies. Not only is the LDC
responsible for choosing their suppliers and for portfolio diversification, they are now
answerable to the state commissions for a hindsight review of these decisions. "[C]oncepts of
reliability and portfolio diversillcation and how a portfolio lowers risks in a quantitative
manner are simple, technical problem.s .... Without a way to quantify reliability, there can be
no rational basis to agree on the 'prudency' of paying for reliability." 69 Without the
F.E.R.C. purchase gas adjustment (PGA) approval process, state commissions question their
ability to review utility filings. The LDC must convince the state commissions that its gas
supply choices were the most prudent choices it could make. However, since the LDC still
operates in a mostly regulated marketplace, regulators "retain the essential task of ma,king sure
that the obligation to serve does not get lost in the pushing and shoving of competition. "70
Many state commissions, including Colorado,71 are reconsidering the gas cost

66

/d.

67

Typically, the core customer is served under the LDC's firm sales service tariff, is heat sensitive, uses low
volumes of natural gas and has no alternate fuels available- the small residential customer. In contrast, the non
core customer takes sales service under a flexible rate schedule, has installed dual fuel equipment, and takes
interruptible or firm transportation service- the small commercial or industrial customer. The New York Public:
Service Commission listed non core customer criteria: service by contract not tariff, direct customer participation in
commo<lity and capacity markets, alternative fuel capability and minimum volume (S,OOOdth) or minimum purchase
conditions ($10,000 annually.) New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of Staff On Competitive
Market Options For The State's Natural Gas Utilities, Foster Report, May 26, 1994, at 19.
68

Foster Report, February 24, 1994, at 10.

69

Jd.

70 NARUC/DOE Gas Panelists Agree That Smooth LDC Operations So Far In 1994 Clear Path For State
Regulators To Forge More Flexible Rules, foster Report, February 24, 1994, at 14.
71 "In The Investigation Of Gas Cost And Purchased Gas Adjustment Clauses For Regulated Gas Utilities,"
Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 931-701G, December 9, 1993; "Commission Order Closing
Investigation And Ordering The Development Of Modifications To The Gas Cost Adjustment And Purchase Gas
Adjustment Filing And Review Process," Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 931-701G, April 12,
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adjustment (GCA) or purchase gas adjustment (PGA) filings to determine if (1) the
GCA/PGA is still necessary; (2) if the GCAIPGA cost components are accurate and the costs
should be passed through to the consumers; and (3) if the level of review at the state
commission is sufficient now that F.E.RC. is no longer scrutinizing purchase gas costs at the
federal level. The Colorado Public Utilities Commission refused to eliminate the current
GCA/PGA filings but instead scheduled informal conferences to "develop modifications to the
GCA filing and review procedures" which will assist the commission in its new oversight role
of substantively reviewing these filings.
•
The New Jersey state commission considered whether "review of specific purchas~d
gas costs [should] be abandoned in favor of benchmark regulation, such as performance based
regulation." 72 At least one state commission (New York Public Service Commission)
is reviewing three different approaches for reviewing LDC gas purchasing practices: "preapprovals, contemporaneous indexing, and post hoc prudence assessments. "73 Without
question, pre-approval of the contract portfolio would give the utility a sense of security by
"publicly and procedurally committing the commission. " 7~
Of fundamental concern to all LDCs is the issue of state commissions actively
participating in both a pre-review and a post-review of ~DC gas supply decisions. Seeking
security in this volatile gas market, LDCs support the prior approval of supply and capacity
portfolios. F.E.RC. Commissioner Jim Hoecker agrees. Prudence review standards and
procedures "have historically held gas management to a standard of care, if not 'clairvoyance,'
that '\vill foil peak market responses in the future. Distributors should no longer be held
exclusively to long term firm supply commitments and the premium those arrangementsentail."75
·

Integrated Resource Planning
In addition, Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) initiatives have been demanded by
many state commissions. Long range least cost demand side management (DSM) and supply
side forecast planning is an attempt to asse.rt a "pre-review" of gas costs and gas supply
expenditures. Utilities are hopeful that a ''pre-review" or "pre-approval" of gas costs and gas
supply expenditures will decrease the need for audits or hearings. To date, LDCs have filed
DSM programs in at least sixteen states with IRP dockets opened in at least eleven states.

1995.
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Commissioner Donald Santa Raises Natural Gas Issues Facing State Re!!ulators In Kevnote Address To New
Jersey Gas Summit Conference, Foster Report, No. 1988, July 21, 1994 at 4.
n New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of Staff On Competitive Market Options For The
State's Natural Gas Utilities, Foster Report, No. 1980, May 26, 1994 at20.
74

Jaffe, Adam and Joseph Kalt, Insight On Oversight, Fortnightly, April 15, 1994 at24- 25.
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Commissioner Hoecker Outlines State And Federal Roles In Coming To Terms With New Economic
Circumstances OfNatural Gas Industry, Foster Report, No. 1983, June 16, 1994 at 5.
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However, generic natural gas DSM and IRP standards are being rejected in various
states on the grounds that review of purchased gas adjustment filings accomplish the same
thing as IRP, that competition makes IRP incentives less necessary to ensure lower gas
prices/6 and/or that the regulatory process may not be an appropriate public intervention
vehicle or an effective policy instrument for achieving IRP objectives.77 Some state
commissions have reviewed gas IRP options and have concluded:
[T]hat the need exists for pro-competitive. incentive based policies in the gas
sector and that an IRP process should focus more attention on the supply side
. of LDC operations . . .. [Furthermore,] PUCs should consider moving toward
less regulation to facilitate the movement toward greater competition in the
energy industry.. .. A participatory or interventionist IRP process can either
impede competition, especially when customer choices are obstructed, or be
ineffective or redundant when customers have options to override the intended
·
purposes. 78

The IRP process is no longer seen as the panacea for all natural gas supply concerns.

Incentives
State commissions must consider rate incentives for unbundled LDCs, especially for
those LDCs which continue to provide gas sales service to their core customers. Incentive
plans must be tailored on an individual basis to meet the unique concerns of each LDC.
LDCs should actively lobby against state commission attempts to create "generic" incentive
plans.
Incentive plans vary from state commission to state commission. The New York
Public Service Commission is considering whether it should allow the LDC to retain 15% of
the net revenues or credits from capacity release and other pipeline services, with 85% passed
along to its customers. Incentives for previous firm sales service customers might either

76

The Colorado Public Utility Commission ended its IRP docket for natural gas utilities when it concluded that
generic IRP gas standards were generally opposed. Three reasons were listed by the Commission: (I) natural gas
production is a competitive industry; (2) there was no substantial evidence that there is cost effective demand-side
management measures for natural gas; (3) there are pending dockets which allow parties to raise issues relating to the
prudency of utility purchases of natural gas and the utilities ' incentives to purchase the least cost natural gas. "Re:
Investigation Into The Development Of The Gas Rules Concerning Integrated Resource Planning," Colorado Public
Utilities Commission, Docket No. 92R-287G, May 26, 1994. The IRP issues, in particular supply side.management,
will be reviewed in the Colorado PUC investigation of gas costs and purchased gas adjustment clauses. See note 71

supra.
77
Not all state commissions are enamored with the IRP process. In an article entitled A Real Loser, Illinois
Commissioner Ruth Kretschmer states " •. the reality is that gas rRP is not cost-effective. In fact, it's a clear loser. •
Kretschmer, Ruth and Larry Mraz, Fortnightly, March 1, 1994 at 17. Third Survey Of State Developments Shows
More Utiliry Commissions Support Rate And Business Incentives For LDCs, Foster Report, No. 2002, October 27,
1994 at ll [hereinafter Third Survev).
71

Jd at 10-11.
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allow the LDC (1) to retain the amount realized above the previously forecasted margin or (2)
to absorb any shortfall below the margin; or (3) to allocate net revenues on an 85%/15%
sharing basis until the core customer has generated sufficient net revenues to offset its full
allocation of fiXed costs.79
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities issued a generic notice of inquiry and
order requesting comments on incentive regulation for natural gas companies to consider
performance based regulatory processes.80 The Commission posits that "incentive regulation
ties a utility's level of cost recovery to a predetermiJ!ed performance indicator or mix of
indicators, or to external indices such as a price level or expe~ted productivity levels. It also
recognizes the legitimacy of profit as an important motivator for utilities as long as customers
benefit beyond levels likely under current regulation ... three general approaches to incentive
regulation: (1) use of a broad-based or narrowly-targeted incentives, (2) price caps, and (3)
rate of return bandwidth."
The California Public Utilities Commission has approved a tailor made base rate
incentive plan for San Diego Gas & Electric Co.; this plan includes (I) a five year review
cycle, (2) a cap on revenues sUbject to changes in inflation, customer growth and productivity,
(3) regressive revenue sharing, and (4) performance incentives.
The Georgia Public Service Commission is reviewing plans to promote new business
for utilities, including discounts and cash incentives for targeted businesses. For example,
"United Cities Gas Co., is currently operating an incentive plan that is applied to new
customers that bring an annual load of at least 27,000 Mcf and to existing cus~omers that raise
their load by 13,500 Mcf. A 40% discount on marginal cost is attributed to the eligible
customer in the first year, 30% in the second year, 20% in the third year, and 10% in the
fourth year." 81
However, at least one state commission (Connecticut Department of Public Utility
Control) concluded that it was premature to implement a gas cost incentive mechanism.
Indeed, the· Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control required utilities to submit a
load duration cUrve, a load factor calculation and a capacity utilization factor for the twelve
month period as part of the annual PGA deferred gas cost filing; this additional information
might be used as performance standards for future incentive type gas supply cost
mechanisms. 82 .

79

New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report Of Staff On Competitive Market Options For The
State's Natural Gas Utilities, Foster Report, No. 1980, May 26, 1994 at 20 [hereinafter New York Public Service
Commission}.
10

Third Survey supra note 77, at 5.

11

/d. at 9.

n Connecticut Regulatory Commission Issues Decision On LDC Issues Stemming From Order No. 636;
Determines Need For Unbundling Of LDC Services And Prescribes Mechanisms For Recoverv Of Transition Costs,
Foster Report, No. 1989, July 28, 1994 at 22.
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LDC Marketing Affiliates
Another issue which the state regulators must consider is how to deal with LDC
mar~et affiliates. Many LDCs wiJI contemplate the formation of an unregulated market

affiliate to compete with aggregators and producers. Questions similar to those F .E.RC.
grappled with are as follows: Should states adopt. an Order No. 497 marketing affiliate-type
rule? Is there a potential for cross subsidies? Should core customers bear the risk of the
marketing affiliate's offsystem activities if they don't share in the commensurate benefits
where the affiliate is profitable? Is there discrimination or favoritism in the LDC' s treatment
of the marketing affiliate?'3
One area in which market affiliate issues arise is in offering rebundled sales service
(gas supply .plus transportation) to customers. Eligibility to market gas through unregulated
affiliates in their own service territories raises state commission concerns. Because of the
potential for abuse, some commissions restrict the LDCs by disallowing the use of market
affiliates in the parent's service territories.84
There is no indication that Order No. 497 will be repealed and so state commissions
will be tempted to use the F .E.R.C. order as a template for state regulation. This type of
oversight is unnecessary at the state level and will inhibit competition. State commissions
must be encouraged to adopt a complaint procedure - if a complaint is lodged by a third
party, the state commission will investigate and, if necessary, resolve market affiliate
concerns.

Unbundling at the State Level
Smaller local distribution company customers behind the city gate are the only major
segment of the natural gas industry left to deregulate fully. 85 The pressure to unbundle at
the local level will be insunnountable for the LDCs and for the state commissions. Indeed,
the question is no longer "if' unbundling will occur at the LDC level, but "when. "86 Many

ll Commissioner Don Santa Raises Natural Gas Issues Facing State Regulators In Keynote Address To New
Jersey Gas Summit Conference, Foster Report, No. 1988, July 21, 1994 at 4 (hereinafter Commissioner Don Santa}.

u •New York Public Service Commission," supra note 79, at 20.
15 Pruner, David, U.S. Gas Market Adapting To Commoditization: Electricitv Likely To Follow Similar Course,
Oil & Gas Journal, March 13, 1995 at 66 (hereinafter Pruner] . .
16 Pennsylvania regulators are urged to "pennit gas utilities to depart from their merchant role and give customers
more competitive gas purchase choices based on market-driven prices and services." Panel Votes To Brim~ 636 To
State Level, Gas Daily, May 4, 1994 at 5. "The New York State Public Service Commission will·- hear opinions on
taking Order 636 to a state level." N .Y. Commission To Hear Ideas On Unbundling, Gas Daily, June 8, 1994 at 4.
Staff at the Ohio Public Utilities Commission concluded, "the intrastate natural gas industry can no longer operate in
a paternalistic manner whereby regulatory edict decides which uses and which consumers of gas are entitled to
preferential treatment under varying circumstances and conditions. The LDCs, while retaining upstream capacity and
commodity planning and acquisition responsibility for a yet to be tully defmed captive or core class of consumers,
can no longer conduct operations in the black box fashion of a previous era .... Staff recommended that it relieve
LDCs of a finn obligation to provide commodity in the event of a failure in the transportation of gas supply and
adopt-· a best efforts only obligation." Survev Of States Uncovers No Radical Effort To Refonn LDC Regulations

21

believe that the "unbundling of services, each priced at the cost of service, best achieves the
goals of promoting financially strong utilities, fair rates to all classes of customers, efficient
utility management, and the filtering down of benefits of upstream competition."87
There is general agreement that the spread of unbundling to the LDCs will begin with
open access transportation and from there spread to the unbundling of LDC storage with
storage capacity held by industrials or an aggregator. In addition to firm and interruptible
transportation and storage service, LDCs will offer released firm transportation, various
seasonal peak and off peak services and emergency trilJlSPortation. 88
LDC open access transportation allows third party shippers to move gas on the LDC
distribution transportation system.89 New Mexico was the first state commission to
encourage open access transportation, followed closely by Colorado.90 Basically, the LDC
open access transportation tariffs on file with the state commissions mirror the pipeline-filed
F.E:R.C. open access transportation tariffs, promising nondiscriminatory transportation of third
party gas at a set transportation rate. Since gas aggregators and marketers have the most to
benefit from open access transportation at the local level, it is not surprising that gas
aggregators or marketers are confirmed proponents of gas utility unbundling and service
options to small commercial, industrial end users and groups of residential end users. 91

This Winter, But Ideas For Local Responses To F.E.R.C.'s Restructuring Of Natural Gas Pipelines Are Being
Explored, Foster Report, No. 196S, February 10, 1994 at 12 (hereinafter Survey OfStatesJ.. Wisconsin Public Service
Commission is leaning toward "let[ting] the free market decide," and therefore taking steps •to expand operations
beyond their franchise territories and are competing for outside industrial customers." Survey Of States supra at 16;
Election Forces States To Quicken Unbundling Pace, Gas Daily, February 14, 1995 at 1.
11
"Unbundling of services.at cost-based rates offers the prospect of achieving to a greater degree the policy
objectives of regulation. All classes of customers would be treated fairly by being charged rates based on cost of
service. If a wide menu of unbundled services is offered, customers would be able to determine what types and levels
of service they want Most importantly, unbundling allows alternate-fuel and gas-on-gas competition to put pressure
on LDCs to reduce their costs and rates for all customers and to be innovative in their development of new types of
services and in their gas supply acquisition strategies.~ Monacell supra note 59, at 15.
11
Unbundling At LDC Level Will Feature New Set Of Problems, NARUC Told, Inside F.E.R.C., August 3,
1992 at 13.
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In fact. transportation by the LDCs has increased dramatically according to the American Gas Association
(AGA); "A large percentage of the medium to large LDCs currently offers some type of transportation service .•• The
percentage of volumes delivered to commercial, industrial and electric utility customers as transportation climbed
steadily from 42.7% in 1988 to 46.6% in 1989, S0.6% in 1990, 53.7% in 1991 and 56% in 1992. AGA Finds LDC
Transportation On Upswing, Firm Supply Predominating, Inside F.E.R.C., October 31, 1994 at 19. AGA figures for
1993 continue to show increased transportation by the LDCs.
90

Open Access Transportation, NMPUC Rule 660; Open Access Transportation, Colo. PUC 4 CCR 723-1;
Pennsylvania PUC Adopts Guidelines For Treatment Of.Order 636 Transition Costs Flowed To LDCs And Proceeds
With Development Oflntrastate Natural Gas Transportation Rules In Post-636 Era, Foster Report, No. 1952,
November 4, 1993 at 21.
91

State Commissions Tiptoe Toward Gas Utility Market Innovations, Foster Report, No. 1986, July 7, 1994 at
10 [hereinafter State Commissions Tiptoe).
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Unbundling And Rebundling The Core/NonCore Customers
The most difficult problem faced by the LDCs and state commissions is the LDCs'
continuing obligation to serve its customers' (an obligation not held by marketers or
aggregators). Conservative analysts encourage the unbundling of LDC services for non-core
customers to allow non-core customers the economic benefits of market priced competition.92
They conclude that unbundled services offered to non-core customers should be offered on a
"best efforts" basis, with individual circumstances determining whether such services are
offered at cost or at market prices. If non core customers are unbundled, there need not be
state regulatory oversight of gas purchases as the competitively priced market will replace
state regulation.
However, regulatory oversight of gas purchases made for core customers remains
essential and indeed, "must necessarily increase in scope."93 LDCs are burdened with the
duty to serve the core market.

We will never achieve a level playing field contested .by like
players if one of the players has to bear a load which the others
shun: the core .... The issue ... is severely complicated by the
cumbersome burden of the market participant with core
responsibilities and the social interest in the survival of that
entity . . .. [P]roper ... regulation turns on r~ognition that the
marketplace has ... [distinguished] between ... [the core and
non-core markets] ....94
There are a few who challenge this position. Former F.E.R.C. Commissioner Charles

Stalon advocates that "state regulators ... rethink an LDC's obligation to serve." This
·obligation "needs to be modified dramatically; with an eye toward eliminating it after the new
industry structure is seasoned. "95 But it is not simply a matter of removing the LDC
obligation to serve. Staton raises such questions as:

[W]ill an LDC have a continuing obligation to provide sales service to a
customer that wants only transportation service; or what will be the response to
pressures to mandate that LDCs offer transportation on terms comparable to
that embedded in retail sales service; and what will be the response when an
LDC seeks to recover transition costs, or stranded costs, associated with gas
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Foster Report, No. 1965, February 10, 1994 at 11; Foster Repo.rt, No. 1967, February 24, 1994 at 16; Foster
Report, No. 1968, March 3, 1994 at 31.
tJ New York Public Service Commission supra note 79, at 20; Regulators See Need For Utilities To Continue
Bundled Service Option, Gas Utility Report, February 17, 1995 at l.
94 Gas Utility Incentive Rate Mechanisms In California Differentiate Core And Non•Core Customer Mix. Fessler
Tells NARUC/DOE Conference, Foster Report, No. 1966, February 17, 1994 at 3.
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fn The Post..Order 636 Industry. LDCs Should Concentrate ... Inside F.E.R.C., February 14, 1994 at 6.
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supply that were intended for a customer that no longer wants to purchase from
the distributor?96
Commissioner Santa raises an additional issue: "If an LDC decides to exit the gas merchant
business ... would state regulators release the LDC from its obligation to be the supplier of
last resort and, if so, then who will be?"97
Every state commission will eventually deal with the issue of unbundling as LDCs will
watch their competitors and imitate them. State commissions will be presented with
unbundling issues whether they have initiated proceedings of their own and may emulate
resolutions adopted by other state commissions or F.E.R.C..98
Dissatisfied with or not wishing to be limited to the unbundled options, some LDCs
prefer the rebundled option - optional merchant-bundled services. Swimming against the
unbundling tide, two LDCs have "asked for complete pricing flexibility in the large volume
market" by proposing programs which would ''wrap together released capacity with gas supply
to serve larger end users. "99 Acting as agent, the LDC would combine a capacity release and
a pooling program, purchase gas, and arrange for transportation to the burner tip - so-called
"one stop shopping". 100 The LDC would buy competitively priced gas for both the pool and
its own system supply requirements, with th~ lowest cost gas going to system supply needs
and the higher priced supplies to the pool. At the same time, it would acquire firm capacity
on upstream pipelines that either the LDC or another party is releasing. Then the LDC would
schedule the gas to its city gate and if requested by the pool customer, to the burner tip. As
agent it would receive all bills for gas supply and released capacity and would send the pool
customer a single bill for the whole service. 101
Streaming is a form of rebundling which allows the I;DC to dedicate specific gas
supplies to certain customers or markets. Many LDCs claim that "streaming is necessary to
participate effectively in competitive markets. However, core customers must be assured of
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Foster Report, No. 1%8, March 3, 1994 at 31.
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Commissioner Don Santa supra note &3, at 4.
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NARUC's Wint.e r Meeting Held In Washington, D.C. Features F.E.R.C . Commissioner Don Santa And Others
Reporting On Initiatives To Facilitate The States' Grasp or Expanding Competitiveness Or Retail Natural Gas
Market. Foster Report, No. 1968, March 3, 1994 at 3 1.
99
New York LDCs Propose Bundling Released Capacity With Gas Supply, Inside F.E.R.C., July 5, 1993 at 3.
Some LDCs want to offer bundled services to those customers not interested in customized service. Maryland Moves
. Forward On LDC Unbundling, Gas Daily, February 16, 1995 at I.
100
Several companies have expanded this concept to include "one stop energy shopping" by adding oil and
liquids marketing and the marketing of electric power. CNG Executive Has Big Plans For 'One Stop (Energy) Shop,
Energy Daily, January 20, 1995 at I; Transco Establishes Power Marketing Unit; Initial Operations In Eastern U.S.,
Independent Power Report, December 30, 1994 at 8; Petroleum Marketer Fonns Power Marketing Division For
California. Independent Power Report, September 23, 1994 at 6.
101

Id. at 4.
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no adverse impact, must be shown to be better off, and must be protected from undue
discrimination." 102
New Services
In order to be competitive, the LDCs must rethink the services they historically offered
(residential, firm non residential and interruptible gas sales service) and consider offering new,
additional services. These new services are "unbundled." Basically, "the customer is entitled
to choose any, all or none of its gas related services and only pay for those it wants ... an a Ia
carte approach can save the customer money by allowing him to choose only those services he
believes he needs." 103 Regulators are actively encouraging LDCs to offer new services.
The New Jersey Board of Regulatory Commissioners' guidelines required LDCs (1) to
eliminate any minimum volume restrictions, (2) to remove alternative fuel requirements, (3) to
allow the aggregation of small customer transportation availability, (4) to offer storage
balancing and standby services and (5) to offer a mechanism for notifying in-state customers
of available interstate capacity. In response to these guidelines, new natural gas transportation
service options were filed, without size limits or alternative fuel requirements. 104 For
example, New Jersey Natural Gas Co. won commission approval to unbundle transportation
services from sales; it has implemented a menu of services including finn transportation,
interruptible transportation, supply aggregation, storage and balancing, and interruptible sales.
It removed any minimum volume restrictions, alternate fuel requirements and was permitted to
aggregate when feasible to make small customer transportation available.
Threatened by the loss of its historic customer base, pressed to compete with
aggregators and marketers, many LDCs will (in addition to their sales service) offer additional
services to attract and/or keep customers. 105

102
New York Public Service Commission Will Evaluate Report On Staff On Competitive Market Options For
The State's Natural Gas Utilities, Foster Report, No. 1980, May 26, 1994 at 18.
101 Elizabethtown Gas Seeks New Jersey State Board Of Commissioners' Approval Of Additional Unbundled
Services, Foster Report, No. 1972, March 31, 1994 at 25.
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Third Survey supra note 77, at 10.

101 Market-based pricing of LDC balancing services for transportation customers. The balancing charges will be
capped at the utility's undiscounted fully embedded cost until questions about market power are answered. State
Commissions Tiptoe supra note 41, at 10.
Flexible contract rates for gas;
Gas marketing programs for excess capacity in nonpeak periods;
Aggregation and Pooling - One modified natural gas supply pool tariff for onsystem transportation
customers aggregates on behalf of qualified customers commingled gas supplies, from each interstate pipeline, that
may be purchased either on a short term or long term basis. The supplies may be coupled with interruptible
transportation service or finn transportation service secured through capacity release for delivery to the city gate.
Pool customers are free to purchase from the pool or from other marketers/brokers depending on which option is the
least cost supply alternative. One unique element of the proposed service is an "un·finn quoted price and customer
nomination procedure provided through an 800 toll free telephone number ·~ the actual price will be slightly higher or
lower than the requested price but the change will not be significant." ld., at 14.
Negotiated gas sales program;
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It is no longer appropriate to ask the question, "Will local distribution companies
deregulate?'' Now the question is, "When?" Local distribution companies will grapple with
the issues which plagued pipelines (unbundling, competition, market-based rates, market
affiliates, open access transportation) and struggle with their position of "gas supply provider
of last resort." Faced with these deregulation issues, state commissions must decide whether
to retain broad authority over the retail services by forcing the LDC to remain as principal
aggregator and merchant or give up that authority to the unregulated market. 106 State
commissions will be tempted to adapt F.E.RC. reso~utions to these issues. While
deregulation at the local level will accomplish the goal of competition from wellhead to
burner tip by bringing the low-priced well head gas to the consumer, it will also increase state
commission regulation over LDC activity. The LDC's work is before them- they must
convince state commissions that market based regulation, not increased state commission
regulation is the best way to accomplish F.E.RC.'s goal.

The Canadian Experience
Many of these issues were raised and resolved almost ten years ago in Canada. The
"Halloween Agreement" 107 deregulated the Canadian natural gas industry by lifting the
controls on natural gas commodity prices, allowing market forces to determine prices, and
removing barriers between willing buyers and sellers. This agreement forced TransCanada
Pipe Line to eliminate its merchant function; services were unbundled in 1987. Eastern

Offpeak firm service for sales and transportation;
Finn transportation program that includes an initial allotment of 40 MMc£/d of capacity for delivery of gas
purchased by small commercial and industrial customers from third party suppliers. Participating suppliers are
required to accept, under prearranged capacity releases at maximum rates, a portion of the LDC's finn transportation
capacity in interstate pipelines that is equivalent to their customers' peak day use. /d.
Prearrane:ed transportation and storage capacity releases provided that the designated replacement shipper
matches the highest bid in the interstate pipeline' s bidding process. End-Users Concerns About Problems That Direct
Assignment, Inside F.E.R.C., March 7, 1994 at 16.
Capacity release along F.E.R.C. Order No. 636 pipeline capacity release- release on a finn, offpeak finn,
or recallable basis, and the term of each release would be set based on the utility's determination of the period over
which the capacity will not be needed for other services.
Capacity release option of direct capacitv assignment to LDCs' customers without going through the
F.E.R.C. Order No. 636 bidding process.
Hedging, futures and swaps
In order to remain competitive, LDCs must utilize "fmancial instruments such
as futures, options and swaps to provide •. supply security to its customers." /d. at 13. Most state commissions do
not have specific rules prohibiting the hedging of gas supply or recovery of hedging costs; however, only about IS%
of the LDCs currently hedge gas purchases. Yet, "61% indicated that their gas suppliers currently hedge for them."
Walher Ill, Harold, Paying The Piper, Fortnightly, April 15, 1994 at 33. While it appears that most LDCs have not
realized the economic benefit afforded them by engaging in futures., options, swaps and hedging, it is apparent that
these financial tools will have to be added to the LDC's portfolio of services.
Electronic Data Services - use of the EBB to locate space on interstate pipelines and real time measurement
to allow the sale/transport of gas for shorter periods.
106

Huntoon, supra note 61, at 25.
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Agreement Among The Governments Of Canada, Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan on Natural Gas
Markets And Prices, October 31, 1985.
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Canadian LDCs entered into pure transportation contracts with TransCanada Pipe Line. The
National Energy Board ordered "operating demand" capacity release to provide direct access
for end users to supply in Western Canada. Gas deregulation was implemented during a
period of supply surplus. The new regulatory framework facilitated competition between end
users' direct purchase and LDC system supply. This encouraged competition, and gas-on-gas
competition was vigorous. The LDCs' traditional long term supply could not compete with
short tenn direct purchase supply. 108
Similar to our experience, Canadian agents, brokers and marketers were new players in
the deregulated gas market - players who were dealing directly with the LDCs'
customers. 109 The new players had market knowledge and access to information and
communication technology; they offered new services - storage, load balancing, information
and control systems, financial risk management. Canadian LDCs were concerned that the new
players would capture other segments of their business - billing, customer service and
appliance rental. Finally, Canadian LDCs concluded that direct purchase did not threaten their
business so long as this supply security was not compromised. 110 At that point, many
Canadian LDCs embraced the new players by forming broker/aggregator subsidiaries. Instead
of competing with the new players, they recognized new business opportunities.
The Canadian LDCs also faced the issue of their obligation to supply gas to end users.
Even though Canadian LDCs do not have a statutory obligation to serve, 111 most
acknowledged a "political" obligation to serve: public policy considerations dictate supplying
residential customers and LDCs could not selectively shut off customers.
The typical Canadian LDCs' 1995 gas portfolio bears no resemblance to their portfolio
prior to deregulation. Facing down the major deregulation issues, the Canadian LDCs have
redefined the scope of their business and their risk. Their concern with the regulatory
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In 1985, Canadian LDC system supply equaled 100% of the volumes distributed; in 1995, Canadian LDC
system supply equaled 40% of the volumes distributed.
109 In Ontario, there are two direct purchase options through which customers purchase pipeline capacity and
obtain gas from nonutility suppliers: I) the transmission option is used by large volume industrial customers who
purchase their own pipeline capacity and manage their own gas supply; and 2) buy/sell option is used by all customer
classes (approximately 250,000 residential customers). The buy/sell option works in the following manner: "/\
customer enters into a contract with a producer or an intennediary (broker or marketer) who agrees to supply gas to
the utility at a specified delivery point as agent of the customer. Once the agency agreement is in place, the LDC is
required to purchase the gas supply at a predetennined buy/sell reference price which is set by the Ontario Energy
Board based on the utility 's weighted average cost of gas less any relevant transportation and administrative charges.
At the burner tip, the retail customer is charged the same bundled retail rate as the sales or system customer_ . [f]he
distribution service provided by the utility is the same for all customers. A buy/sell customer, however, benefrts
when its agent is able to purchase alternate gas supplies at a lower cost than the utility's buy/sell reference price. The
net gain is shared between agent and direct customer pursuant to tenns of the agency contract.• Ontario's Direct Gas
Purchase Program Includes Substantial Residential Customer Base, Foster Report, No. 2018, February 23, 1995 at II.
110 Tbere were two direct purchase customers in 1986; this number increased to two hundred twenty-five
thousand in 1995. Of that number, approximately 190,000 are residential customers. Speech Notes, Jim Hamilton,
Director, Policy Pevelopmen~ Marketing, Consumers' Gas Company.
111

Section 54 of Ontario's Public Utilities Act.
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treatment of gas costs- gas price volatility, management, prudency review and indexed
supply contracts - has been met by the knowledge that a more competitive market place
requires less regulatory intervention. Consumers' Gas Company, Canada's oldest and largest
LDC, has adopted the following philosophy: (1) We make money by distributing gas, not
buying and selling gas; (2) We should not be perceived as a barrier between the customer
and cheaper gas; (3) We will acquire a portfolio of least cost gas at moderate risk for
customers favoring LDC gas supply; (4) We will facilitate access by any customer to
alternate supplies provided that the supply security is .n,o t threatened and no subsidy from
system supply customers is required. 112
The Canadian natural gas deregulation experience illustrates that LDCs can benefit
from embracing their competitors, increasing transportation load and market-based rates. To
accomplish these positive goals, state commissions must give LDCs the appropriate business
tools to compete in the unregulated market place: unbundled and discounted transportation
rates, assignment of excess capacity and the end of subsidization of residential customers,113
or incentive rates if the LDCs continue to serve core residential customers.

Part 4. Deregulation of the Electric Industry
The electric industry is one of the last major industries in the United States to be
deregulated, following the telephone, airlines, and natural gas industries. With assets of $185
billion, it is more than twice as large as the natural gas industry, encompassing 3000 utility
companies. (There are only 300 natural gas LDCs!) 114
Spurred on by its experience of deregulating the natural gas industry and by the
electric power shortages during the winter of 1993-1994, 115 F.E.RC. has begun the
restructuring of the electric power industry. 116 Many wonder if the deregulation of the
111
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tu Driscoll, Mary, Utility Regulators Must Cut LDC Shackles, Says Hare, The Energy Daily, February 7, 1992 at
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Pruner, David, U.S. Gas Market Adapting To Commoditization; Electricity Likelv To Follow Similar Course,
Oil & Gas Journal, March 13, 1995 at 66.
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"The performance of the still-regulated electricity industty during the 1993·94 winter was almost as ·
disappointing as.the gas Industry's performance during the winter of 1976·77. The P-J-M pool, serving the middle
Atlantic states, avoided a catastrophic regional blackout only by implementing brownouts and rolling blackouts, and
by convincing the federal government, the governments of several states, and virtually all private businesses in the
region to cease all operations for a day." Pierce, Richard, The State Of The Transition To Competitive Markets In
Natural Gas And Electricity. 15 Energy Law Journal 323 (1994) at 324.
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F.E.R.C. began its restructuring of the electric industry on a case by case basis by requiring open access
tariffs which provide comparable transmission service before granting the authority to conduct market based electric
power transactions. Heartland Energy Services, Inc., Docket Nos. ER94-108·000, ER94-475·000, 68 F'.E.R.C.
P61,223 (August 9, 1994); F.E.R.C. extended its comparability of service requirement to include a comparability of
pricing - transmission pricing must meet the traditional revenue requirement, must reflect comparability, but may
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electric industry will follow the pattern established by the F.E.R.C. for the deregulation of the
117
natural gas industry.
Without question, the F.E.R.C. 's natural gas unbundling experience
will influence the course and timing of electric power industry deregulation.

Competition, Competition, Competition
Many electric utility executives decry the restructuring of the electric power industry,
emphasizing the differences between the electric and natural gas industries and expressing
fears that restructuring will harm reliability, increase consumer rates, cause electric utility
bankruptcies, and generally bring about the demise of the electric power industry. 118 Some
are resorting to the rhetoric of the early natural gas restructuring days; F.E.R.C. action
amounts to a Pearl Harbor attack on the industry.
F.E.R.C. will not be convinced by these electric utility executive naysayers.
F.E.R.C.'s vision for the energy industry rests on competition. Indeed, "the common thread"
that runs through all of (F.E.R.C.'s) initiatives in the post-Energy Policy Act era is "the goal
to foster greater competition in wholesale power markets by means of open access to
transmission." 119
,
While F.E.R.C. admits that this is an evolutionary.process, it plans to develop "rules of
the road" for the restructured electric industry. 120 If the deregulation of the electric industry
mimics that of the natural gas industry, what specificaJly would that include? Since the goal
for the electric industry is competition, the other components will be comparability, open
access transmission, transition costs, market-based rates, unbundled services and direct access

promote economic efficiency, fairness and practicality. F.E.R.C. Powers Ahead With Plans .F or Competitive Electric
Future ... Energy Daily, October 27, 1994 at I. Texas Utilities Electric Co., Final Order Directing Transmission
Services, Docket No. ER94-4..()00, et al., 69 F.E.R.C. P61,269 (December I, 1994); American Electric Power Service
Corp., 67 F.E.R.C. P61 ,168 (May 11, 1994); El Paso Natural Gas Co., Docket Nos. RP88·184-015, et al., 69
F.E.R.C. P61,155 (November 3, 1994); Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission
Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, Docket No. RM93- 19..000, 69 F.E.R.C. P61,086
(October 26, 1994).
Regional Transmission Groups (RTG) have already been told that they must meet these comparability standards
set forth in the Mega Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Mega-NOPR). Southwest Regional Transmission Assn., Order
Conditionally Approving Regional Transmission Group Filing, Docket No. ER94-1381, 69 F.E.R.C. P61,100 (October
27, 1994) and Western Regional Transmission Assn., Order Accepting Compliance Filing, Docket No. ER94-1288, 71
F.E.R.C. P61,158 (May 16, 1995). Stu'ng by comments of a piecemeal approach to deregulation, F.E.R.C. has recently
issued the electric Mega NOPR, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Ooen Access Non Discriminatory
Transmission Servi.ces By Public Utilities, 70 F.E.R.C. P61,357 (1995); Recovery Of Stranded Costs By Public
Utilities And Transmitting Utilities, IV F.E.R.C. Stats. &. Regs., Proposed Regulations, P32,507 (1994).
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Rogers Expects Electric Comparability To Mirror Gas Industry, The Energy Daily, June 10, 1994 at 3.
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to customers. In response to electric utility deregulation, there will be more company
streamlining, and downsizing, mergers and acquisitions. Electric utilities will compete with
power marketers for their traditional customers. State regulators will consider incentive plans
and utility rate structure refonn. Electricity will become a commodity.

Square Peg, Round Hole?
F.E.R.C. would agree that there are physical, statutory, and competitive differences
between the electric power industry and the natural gas industry. However, are these
differences so monumental that F.E.R.C. should abandon deregulation of the electric industry?
Or alter the path it found successful for the natural gas industry?
Fundamentally, there are physical differences between electric power and natural gas.
Electricity is produced by generators varying in age, size and fuel type; pooling of these units
has allowed utilities to cut costs. 121 Electricity is currently limited to regional markets,
flows at nearly the speed of light and cannot be stored except at great expense;122 wholesale
generation of electricity is priced competitively but there is currently little transmission
competition. 123 In comparison, natural gas is produced from standard wellhead equipment,
commands a nationwide market, is traded as a commodity, moves on the pipeline
transportation grid at 15 to 25 miles per hour; it can be stored and is priced competitively
both by the producer, the transporter, the marketer and when possible, the distributor.
In addition to these physical differences, there are statutory differences. The F.E.R.C.
regulates the electric industry under the Federal Power Act (FPA), amended by the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the Energy Policy Act (EPAct) .. 24 It
regulates the natural gas industry under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), amended by the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Natural Gas .Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989. 125

m Pc.oling "permits a utility peaking at a given time to use the temporary excess capacity of a company peaking
at a different time ....[E]ach intertied utility experiences a decrease in the quantity of generating and reserve capacity
required to support the system." Electricity: A New Regulatory Order?, Congressional Research Service 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 71 (1991) at 67.

m Santa, Donald and Clifford Sikora, Open Access And Transition Costs: Will The Electric Industry Transition
Track The Natural Gas Industry Restructuring? Energy Law Journal, Vol. 15, No.2 (1994) at 218. [hereinafter
Santa].
113
Office Of Technology Assessment, Electric Power Wheeling and Dealing: Technological Considerations For
Increasing Competition 36-37 (1989); William L. Massey, Transition To Competition: Federal Initiatives And
Industry Opportunities, Electricity J., Jan. 1993 at 28.

114
Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. ss791a-82Su (1988); Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUCHA), 15
USC §§ 79z to 79z~ (1988); Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 711-31, 106 Stat. 2776
(1992).
Ill

··~

Natural Gas Act of 1977 (NGA), 15 USC§ 717 (1988); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3432 (1988); Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act, Pub. L. No. 101-160, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
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While limits are placed on F.E.RC. authority, and state jurisdiction is recognized by
both the FPA and the NGA, 126 there are fundamental differences in F.E.R.C.'s jurisdictional
and regulatory authority over electric transmission lines and natural gas transportation
pipelines. First, electric utility construction - the siting and authorization of transmission
facilities- is controlled by state not federal regulation; 127 in comparison, F.E.RC.
authorizes interstate pipeline construction. 128 Second, F.E.R.C. has the specific authority to
order electric transmission service (with certain limitations) but F.E.R.C. can not order access
to i.Dterstate natural gas transportation service. 129 Until recently, these statutory and
regulatory differences have slowed the competitive evolution in the electric power industry.
Bolstered by their experience of deregulating the natural gas industry, F.E.R.C. is unwilling to
be thwarted by these physical and regulatory differences. Chanting the deregulation mantra of
competition, comparability, and market-based rates, F.E.R.C. has focussed on the similarities
of the electric power industry and the natural gas industry.

Round Peg, Round Hole
Without minimizing the differences, there are numerous similarities between the
electric pow~ industry_and the natural gas industry. Both are energy industries, with a public
service obligation. The players in the electric power industry deregulation are similar to those
in the natural gas industry deregulation: bundled generator/transporter/distributor, independent
generators, power marketers, state commissioners, and F.E.R.C. commissioners. Both
comprise of three functions: generation (production), transmission (transportation), and
distribution. Currently, the electric power industry is "bundled" or vertically integratedsimilar to a pre-restructured natural gas company, with all three functions in one corporate
entity.

114
Section 201(a) of the FPA states that F.E.R.C. authority extends •only to those matters which are not subject
to regulation by the States." Section 20J(b) states that unless expressly reserved under part II or part Ill of the FPA,
F.E.R.C.'s jurisdiction does not extend "over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities for
the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter." 16 USC §§ 824f(a), 824b(l) (1988).
Section l(b) of the NGA states that F.E.R.C. jurisdiction does not extend "to any other transportation or sale of
natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the production
or gathering of natural gas." 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1988).
127 Santa Sllpra note 122, at 288; PSI Energy, Inc., 55 F.E.R.C. P61254 at 61,811 (1991) ("The Commis.s ion docs
not have siting or certification authority with respect to transmission lines under Part rr of the Federal Power
Act...[T}be Commission's authority is limited to a review of the rates, term.s and conditions of jurisdictional
agreements to ensure that they are just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory.or prefcrential.");16 USC§
824(a)(I988)(Federal regulation shall extend to part of electric utility business "which consists of the transmission of
electric enc.rgy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce ..." However,
such federal regulation extends "only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the states.")

121

15 U.S.C. §§ 717f{b), 717f(c), 717f(e), 717f(h) (1988).

129 Section 211 of FHA; Policy Statement Regarding Regional Transmission Groups; Ill F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs.
P30,976 at 30,869 (1993). "...section 211 of the FPA ... gave the Commission general authority to order electric
utilities to provide transmission to, inter alia, other electric utilities ...." [EPAct) has significantly expanded the
Commission's authority to order transmission services under section 211.

31

Further, a monopoly exists at the transmission and distribution functions of the electric
industry (similar to the bundled natural gas industry) which hinders competition. Transmission
and distribution functions remain effective monopolies and therefore "continue to be subject to
traditional fonns of regulation because (they) must be integrated in order to achieve society's
preferred level of reliability, and because economies of scale dictate that duplication is an
inefficient way to provide the necessary services."130 Once faced with comparability, open
access and unbundling, there will be electric industry transition costs 131 that some have
placed in the $200 to $300 billion dollar range. 132
Convinced by these similarities, F.E.R.C. has set out to deregulate the electric industry
in record time. 133 In some respects, the deregulation of the electric industry may be easier
than the natural gas industry restructuring. "First, Congress has already made the decision to
mandate equal access to transmission lines (the comparability "golden rule") and to create a
competitive wholesale market Second, most state PUCs have already made the decision to
rely on competitive contracting as the primary vehicle for adding new generating capacity.
Finally, the F.E.R.C. has already authorized firms to charge market-based wholesale electricity
prices when it finds that the firms confront sufficient competition." 134

ll<l Santa supra note 122, at 282. "In theory, the fact that the transportation function is a monopoly means that
transmission-owning electric utilities and natural gas pipelines are able to maintain market power in the transportation
product market, and may exercise market power in the product markets for delivered gas or electricity as a result of
transpo.rtation market power." Id.

131
•

Electric utility transition costs will arise from (I) utility assets, regulatory assets and other costs ... made

uneconomic as a result of competition in generation markets: and (2) loss of market to competing sellers with access
to new purchasers through enhanced electric transmission services; and (3) contracts to purchase power from third
parties at above market prices." ld at 295, note 109.
m Pierce, Richard, The State Of The Transition To Competitive Markets In Natural Gas And Electricitv, IS
Energy Law Journal 323, at 337 (hereinafter Pierce].

m Deregulation of the natural gas industry occurred over a number of years: beginning with fully integrated
companies (production, transportation, distribution) offering wellhead to bumertip services, the 1970s surplus and
shortages, Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1979, the 1987 Order No. 436 voluntary open access on gas
pipelines, Order No. SOO, and culminating in 1992 with Order No. 636 which unbundled pipeline sales from pipeline
transportation service. Using natural gas deregulation as a guide, many believe that the deregulation of the electric
industry will be completed in less than five years. However, there are some who warn that the upheaval is so great,
that the electric industry will do everything possible to delay the inevitable. Production Costs Point To Competitive
Winners-Moody' s, Energy Daily, November 1, 1994 at 3; J;>ierce supra note 132, at 338, 349.
m Pierce supra note 132, at 329; EPAct §§ 711-726; American Electric Power Service Corp., Orde.r on
Rehearing and Clarification, 67 F.E.R.C. P61,168 (May 11, 1994) stated that an open access tariff must offer third
parties access on a comparable basis, under the same terms and conditions as the transmission provider's use of the
system and the cost of transmission must not be unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive; Watkiss, Jeffrey, The
Energy Policv Act of 1992: A Watershed For Competition Tn The Wholesale Power Marke~ 10 Yale J. On Reg. 447
(1993); Joskow, Paul, Regulatory Failure, Regulatorv Reform. and Structural Change In :rhe Electrical Power
Industry, Brookings Paper On Econ. Activity, Microeconomics 125 (1989); Tenenbaum, Bernard, Market-Based
Pricing Of Wholesale Electric Services, Electricity J. 30-45 (1991); Environmental Action v. F.E.R.C., 996 F.2d 401
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Town Of Norwood v. F.E.R.C., 962 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

32

In the natural gas industry, F.E.R.C. broke through this transportation/distribution
monopoly by mandating competition, to be achieved through comparability of service and
unbun~li~g. ~on:vm~d by its experi~nce deregulating the natural gas industry that the
transmiSStonldlstnbutlon monopoly Will be erased by introducing competition to mitigate
market power, F.E.R.C. took its first step to deregulate the electric utility industry on March
29, 19?5 with the electric Mega-NOPR (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
The Electric M~a-NOPR
The electric Mega-NOPR "Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access
Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services By Public Utilities" and "Recovery Of Stranded
Costs By Public Utilities And Transmitting Utilities" commits F.E.R.C. to a policy of reliance
on market driven factors rather than regulatory control in its desire to restructure the electric
industry.
As a basis for F.E.R.C.'s proposed rules, it states as follows:
We find that utilities owning or controlling transmission facilities
possess substantial market power; that, as profit maximizing
firms, they have and will continue to exercise that market power
in order to maintain and increase market share, and will thus
deny their wholesale customers access to competitively priced
electric generation; and that these unduly discriminatory practices
will deny consumers the substantial benefits of lower electricity
prices.•3s
As currently written, the proposal affects only the transmission of power to wholesale
customers (big industrial plants), not retail customers (residential homeowners). However,
F.E.R.C. expects that opening wholesale competition will force the unbundling of the electric
industry at the local level, and in time, lower the cost of electricity for all customers.
Specifically, the NOPR proposes the following: (1) Public utilities file open access
non-discriminatory transmission tariffs. These tariffs must provide point-to-point, network,
and ancillary services. F.E.R.C. would set rates for service in the pro forma generic tariffs
based on a standard formula, using company-specific Form 1 data. (Point-to-point rates
would be "postage-stamp" rather than "distance sensitive.") 1 ~ (2) Public utilities take

ns Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by
Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Ut.ilities, Docket Nos. RM95·8-000
and RM94-7-001, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662 (Apr. 7, 1995), 70 F.E.R.C. P61,357 (1995)
[hereinafter NOPR]; mimeo at 14.
us Jd.; F.E.R.C. proposes a two step process for filing the open access tariffs: (I) each public utility which owns
or operates a transmission system will be required to file an open access tariff in generic· format to be effective sixty
days after the effective date of the fmal rule; (2) Sixry-one days after the final rule becomes effective, utilities are free
to propose Section 205 changes in the rates, tenns and conditions in the generic tariff and customers ~ free to file
Section 206 complaints seeking changes.
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transmission service for their own wholesale transactions under their open access tariff. 137
(3) Public utilities will have an opportunity to recover stranded investment associated with the
open access tariff requirement. Recognizing that it would be unfair to penalize utilities for
reliance upon past regulatory structure, F.E.R.C. would permit'the recovery of "legitimate and
verifiable" stranded investment from departing wholesale customers, provided that the utility
could demonstrate "reasonable expectation" of continuing to serve a departing customer. 138
Taking note of its natural gas deregulation experience, the Mega NOPR does not propose to
terminate existing contracts but rather proposes that all existing wholesale contracts remain in
full force and effect until naturally terminated. 139
The key element in allowing market forces to work is the pricing terms and conditions
under which transmission facilities are used. This Mega-NOPR addresses transmission access
and transmission pricing; it doesn't address generation or distribution. Support of this MegaNOPR will vary depending on the utility's competitive generation prices and the position of
the utility as a high price or low price produ~er of energy in an open transmission grid. 140

Electricity As A Commodity
Energy must be viewed as a commodity. As natural gas has become a commodity,
traded on NYMEX and subject to derivatives, 141 futures and hedging, so will electricity}42
"[AJ spot market in electricity will evolve ... [w]ith prices revealed; a commodity market will
follow. With spot and commodity markets will come the power to reallocate risk and make
capital investment more productive." 143
NYMEX is developing an electric futures contract. An electric futures market will
allow the purchase and sale of specified quantities of commodities for future delivery at a
specific location. Prices will be determined by competitive bidding. The actual transaction
prices will be instantly disseminated throughout the world and serve as a benchmark for

IJT

Jd.

1)8

Jd.

139

Jd mimeo at 133.

••• Initial comments on the NOPR are due on August 7, 1995 and reply comments are due on October 4, 1995.
If the natural gas deregulation pattem is followed, the final order will be quite similar to the March 29th NOPR
regardless of the comments and oral testimony (if scheduled) received by F.E.R.C.
·
101
Derivatives "are complex hedging instruments, such as futures, options, and swaps, used to defray the risk of
changes in interest rates, stock prices, foreign-exchange rates and commodities prices..." Citizens. Lehman Bros.
Fonn Venture For Power Marketing, Derivatives, Independent Power Report, September 23, 1994 at 7.

••z "The coming commoditizatioo of electric power will unbundle price risk from electricity as a 'good.' If
utilities don't do it, new market intennediaries will." Mango, Bob and John Woodley, The Inevitable
Commoditization Of Electric Power Markets, Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No. 20, November 1; 1994 at 27 [hereinafter
Mango).
~<J

!d. at 27.
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commodity value. According to NYMEX, "introducing risk management tools into the
electric industry is a natural outgrowth of the competition currently being fostered.'' 144
While F.E.R.C. insists that it does not have jurisdiction over derivative instruments in power
markets, it is concerned about investment banking firms seeking marketer status so they can
conduct derivative transactions - futures, options and other risk-hedging mechanisms. 14 ~
Generation
Currently, the electric power industry is a vertically integrated industry: generation,
transmission and distribution owned by one corporate entity. This structure is incompatible
with competition. Therefore, competition and open access transmission will drive the
unbundling of the electric utility industry into three separate entities - generation,
transmission, distribution - causing a vertical disintegration of the electric utility
146
industry.
While the move to separate generation assets from their transmission and
distribution units is supported by state commissions, 147 independent power producers148
and po·wer marketers, it is feared by many vertically integrated investor owned utilities.
Investor owned utilities foresee competition forcing unbundling, increased business risk, the
spin off and downsizing of corporate entities, the need for unbundled market flexible rates,
the erosion of their historic customer base once direct access or customer choice is attained at
the distribution level, and the overriding concern of stranded costs.
There have been a number of proposals to disintegrate the electric utility. 149 Each

~ Burkhart, Lori, NYMEX Prepares To Launch The Electric Future, Fortnightly, July 15, 1994 at 39. Mango,
/d. at 27. "The coming commoditization of electric power will unbundle price risk from electricity as a 'good.' If
utilities don't do it, new market intermediaries will." Jd.
1

1
.,

Moler Has Concerns On Derivatives, But Says F.E.R.C. Lacks Jurisdiction, Electric Utility Week, January 23,
I995 at 11; Massey Urges F.E.R.C. Look At Derivative Instruments. Decide Whether To Worrv, Electric Utility
Week, January 16, 1995 at 2.
146
N.Y. Sees End Of Vertical Integration; Backs Stranded·!nvestment Recovery, Electric UtilitY Week, January
9, 1995 at 5; Competition In The Electric Markets, Energy Daily, October 28, 1994 at 1; Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No.
18, October 1, 1994 at 38; National Independent Power Groups Stress Separating Utility Functions, Independent
Power Report, June 17, 1994 at 8.
147
N.Y. Sees End Of Vertical Integration; Backs Stranded-Investment Recoverv, Electric Utility Weekly, January
9, 1995 at 5.
141

AES: Real Reform Requires Splitting Generation From Transmission And Distribution, The Energy Daily,
July 12, 1994 at 1 (hereinafter AES}.
149
One plan suggested by an independent producer requires the utility "to sell off its generation assets, and to
sign a long-term contract, which would include an immediate rate reduction of 5 percent, to buy power from the
purchaser. The utility would be allowed to sell its generation assets as a single entity, in packages or as individual
units; it would be guaranteed at least book value for all of these assets ....[l]f the contract prices were set at a level
that equaled the long-run marginal cost of generation...there would be no stranded asset cost charged to ratepayers ..
But given the low rates associated with competitive electric generation, it is unlikely that buyers would pay much, 1f
anything, for the assets. A long-term contract would increase the value of the plant to potenti_aJ purchasers, an~ they
would bid a higher price for the plant to the selling utility. After the contracts expire, the fac11ities must negotiate
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recognizes the issue of transition costs. "[P]art of managing the regulatory transition to a
more competitive environment is providing a mechanism for natural gas pipelines and electric
utilities to recover legitimate costs incurred to honor sales obligations under the old
regime.'' 1so It is this issue, to a large extent, which will shape the deregulation of the
electric power industry.
Transmission
Functional Unbundling
•
The electric Mega-NOPR does not demand that a vertically integrated electric utility
unbundle corporately.U 1 However, by demanding open access, comparable service and
comparable pricing for transmission, it is pushing the electric utility into functional
unbundling. Functional unbundling requires: (1) the transmission facilities owner take
transmission services for all of its new wholesale transactions under the same tariff under
which third parties take similar service; (2) open access tariffs must separately state rates for
transmission and ancillary service components of each transmission service that it provides;
(3) the utility must rely upon the same electronic network as its transmission customers to
obtain transmission information about its system.
F.E.R.C. recognizes that the NOPR will necessarily establish two separate transmission
arrangements: a wholesale transmission tariff filed with F.E.R.C. and retail transmission
regulation governed by state commissions. Anticipating retail wheeling (or its
equivalent), IS2 F.E.R.C. will exercise jurisdiction over the sale of unbundled transmission
capacity in interstate commerce but exercise no control over the sale of unbundled generation
at retail.

new contract at competitive market rates and terms or must sell on the spot market." This plan would preclude direct
access or retail wheeling - either would allow the customer to bypass these contracts for lower priced generation
options. !d. Wisconsin Electric envisions •splitting today's vertically integrated utilities into natural monopolies and
competitive entities;" it also considered "re·regulated entities." Wisconsin Electric's View Of A More Competitive
Industry, Fortnightly, February 15, 1995 at 17; The National Independent Energy Producers trade group wants utilities
to divest themselves of generation assets, placing any unrecovered, stranded costs in transmission-related charges to be
paid by all users of the transmission system. NIEJ> Savs Transmission Charges Best Way To Recoup Stranded
Investment, Independent Power Report, ~cember 16, 1994 at 5.
150

Santa supra note 122, at 295.

151

F.E.R.C. does note that many utilities might ultimately choose to disintegrate. NOJ>R supra mimeo at 94.

151
End use.rs arranging for their local utility to purchase generation from a third party supplier of the end user's
choice on terms negotiated by the end user, transmit that energy in interstate commerce, and then resell it as part of a
bundled retail sale to the end user (buy-sell transaction).
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Stranded Costs
Having learned first-hand of the upheaval caused by ignoring stranded costs until late
in the deregulation of natural gas industry (Order No. 636), m F.E.R.C. determined not to
repeat that error again. In the Mega-NOPR, F.E.R.C. asserts its duty to address stranded
154
costs.
Having reassured the electric utility industry that stranded costs must be recovered,
F.E.R.C. discussed three alternatives for allocationtsS and then chose to allocate the stranded
costs directly to the departing wholesale customer. This is exactly opposite of the position
taken by F.E.R.C. in the deregulation of the natural gas industry.'56 F .E.R.C. then proposes
to divide recovery of stranded costs into t\vo categories: old wholesale power sales contracts
(pre July 11, 1994) and new wholesale power sales contracts (post July 11, 1994). Stranded
cost recovery will be allowed for contracts entered into after July 11, 1994 only if explicit
stranded cost recovery provisions are contained in the contract. Therefore, firm requirements
customers will be responsible for planning their own power needs beyond the end of any
particular contract term, and the wholesale supplier will be free at the end of such contract
term to sell its power on the open market. Stranded cost recovery will be allowed for
contracts entered into prior to July 11, 1994 if the old contract includes a stranded cost
provision or .if the utility can demonstrate that it had a reasonable expectation of continuing to
serve a departed customer. 157
F.E.R.C. proposes that recoverable stranded costs should be based on a 'revenues lost'
approach rather than a hypothetical cost of service approach. The utility has an obligation to
mitigate its stranded costs by marketing stranded power supplies at competitive market value.
Recoverable costs include not only the actual costs incurred by the utility in the expectation of
continuing to serve the customer but also includes a return on equity at the rate which was
previously approved by F.E.R.C. in the wholesale contract.
F.E.R.C. then refused to consider retail stranded cost determinations, stating that it will
only exercise authority to recover stranded costs occasioned by retail wheeling in the instance
m In its initial attempt at deregulating the natural gas market, F.E.R.C. did not address the transition costs

associated with the burden of uneconomic: take~r-pay contracts negotiated by the pipelines during a natural gas
shortage period in the 1970s. Order No. 436, Regulation Of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol,
lll F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles P30,665 at 31,492·93 (1985), vacated and remanded sub. nom.,
Associated Gas Distributors v. F.E.R.C.. 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988).
Is- F.E.R.C. first raised this issue in its original stranded cost recovery NOPR - issued months before the Mega·
NOPR. Recovery Of Stranded Costs By Public Utilities And Transmining Utilities, 59"Fed. Reg. 35,274 {July 11,
1994). F.E.R.C. uses the date, July 11, 1994, as a benchmark for determining old or new contracts.

m The three choices were as follows: (1) Do nothing, thereby allocating the burden to shareholders; (2) Allocate
the stranded costs directly to the departing wholesale customer; (3) Allocate the costs over a wider group of customers
• all customers, all transmission customers, or various other combinations.
156
F.E.R.C. justified spreading stranded costs over all existing transmission customers because itS seven year
delay in addressing transition costs bad caused significant upheaval in the industry.
·
1$7 A reasonable expectation standard will be decided on a case by case basis using a totality of the circumstances
test Factors such as whether the customer had access to allemate suppliers; the parties' actual course of negotiation
and performance; and communications regarding system planning will be used.
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in which a state regulatory authority lacks the authority to do so. However, it asserts that it
does have authority over stranded costs caused by ' retail-turned-wholesale' customers
(municipalizations). 1sa
Comments filed on the original stranded cost NOPR preview the comments to be
expected in August on the Mega-NOPR. Investor-owned utilities (IOU) state that "recovery
of stranded costs would promote parity pricing."u9 Taking exception to F.E.R.C.'s position
that it lacks jurisdiction ove.r stranded retail costs, the IOUs further conclude that costs
associated with generation facilities - included stran~ed costs - could be included in
F.E.R.C.-jurisdictional rates.
However, the American Public Power Association states that "So-called stranded cost
recovery is a matter that is already dealt with satisfactorily in existing contracts, and recovery
of retail stranded costs should be dealt with by the states." 160 Some state commissions view
stranded costs as a state issue. They argue that federally mandated competition caused the
decrease in generation and distribution assets - assets which are regulated by the states. 161

ua F.E.R.C. will define local distribution facilities pursuant to Section 20I(bX1) of the Federal Power Act. 16

u.s.c. § 824{b)(l)(1988).
"

9

160

Opposing Sides Remain firmly Entrenched In Stranded-Cost Struggle, Inside F.E.R.C., February 6, 1995.
F.E.R.C. Learned The Wrong Lesson From Gas Deregulation, Energy Daily, December 12, 1994 at 1.

161
"Stranded investment may be dealt with by a •. mixture of •.: causing the utility to write-off, write-down or
sell (at market value) some of its assets; recovering stranded investment through entry and exit fees on "defectors•
from the utility; ·- recovering stranded investment in transmission and distribution charges on all consumers •.; and
allowing utilities to find new profitable markets to offset their shares of the stranded investment, such as offering
onsite generation services, cogeneration, DSM,· -·at a profit." Forum, Fortnightly, November 15, 1994 at 50.
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Distribution: Deregulation At The Local Level
Retail Wheeling·Poolco·Buy!Se/1162
Driven by electric prices higher than the national average, higher prices which can not
be explained by demographics or weather patterns, the inevitable has arrived- retail
wheeling. Retail wheeling - unbundling of electric power at the retail level - is a concept
which is already being considered by a number of state commissions. 163 Out in front, the
California P ublic Utilities Commission has proposed the "Blue Book" plan which will
restructure the electric power industry, allowing direct access to all customers (regardless of
their size) by 2002.

162

Retail Wheeling provides direct access to power supply for all consumers. The California "Blue Book" retail
wheeling proposal ("Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming
Regulation, R.94·04·031, [.9~4.032, April20, 1994) would allow large customers with transmission levels above 50
kilovolts to buy their own electric power through retail wheeling. By 2002, all customers would be allowed to choose
their electric supplier. The plan calls for an unbundling of services and rates and a division of customers into core
and noncore groups. CUstomers may choose to receive bundled services from their certificated utility or to require
only those services they need to receive electric power they purchase elsewhere. The California proposal couples
market pricing for competitive services and performance-based ratemaking for existing services. California electric
companies have found this controversial industry restructuring plan acceptable; although they want to push back the
date for full retail wheeling from 2002 to 2~08. Maybe It Isn't Such A Bad Idea After All, Energy Daily, June 9,
1994 at I.
~ • an independent regional power pool company to manage the wholesale power market. Utilities
would continue to own their own lines but Poolco would manage their use. Poolco would provide a spot power price
and would flow the power through distribution companies to retail customers in the same bundled way customers now
receive it. As each company joins Poolco, it would separate transmission grid assets from distribution assets, using a
principle based on where system congestion can be created.
Buy/Sell is a transmission~istribution transaction which will allow eligible customers to choose from any
supplier of electricity inside or outside California, including their local utilities.
153

Retail Wheeling
Happy Motoring For State Regulators? Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No. 12, June 15, 1994 at
46; Wheeling Update, Fortnightly, Vol.132, No. 17, September 15, 1994 at 49; Radford, Bruce, Regulatory Dreams,
Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No. 21, November IS, 1994 at 6. California has taken the lead on retail wheeling; states
whose state commissions or state legislature have addressed retail wheeling are as follows: Connecticut (Retail
Electric Transmission Service, Docket No. 93-09-29, Jan. 27, 1994; Final decision: retail wheeling would not serve
the public interest because of excess generating capacity and potential stranded investment. September 9, 1994;
lnfonnal Roundtable Studies of Retail Wheeling Ordered, January 17, 1995, Docket No. 94·12-13); Ulinois (Changes
in the Structure of the Electric Energy Industry, No.94.R1, April 20, 1994); Massachusetts (Proposal to "Rent"
Transmission and Distribution Access to Customers or Power Suppliers, DPU 94-162, Mass. Energy Agency Puts
Forward Retail Wheeling Plan; Wire Rental, Electric Utility Week, January 9, 1995, at 11.); Michigan (Experimental
Program for Consumers Power Co. and Detroit Edison Co.; Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity, I SO
PUR4th 409, 1994); New York (Competitive Opportunities, Case 93-M-0229, August 9, 1994); Nevada (State
Legislature · Limited Retail Wheeling Statute, S.B. 231- Fears About State Reciprocity Have Killed The Prospects
For Retail Wheeling This Year; Nevada Legislator Nixes Retail Wheeling. For Now, Energy Da.ily, March 13, 1995
at 4; State Commission- Docket No. 94-6024); Ohio (State Legislature - H.B. 676); Texas ("Self Service Wheeling,"
Houston Lighting & Power Co., Docket No. 12138, December 22, 1993); Utah (Pacificorp, No. 90-2035.01, June I,
1993); Vc:nnont (Citizens Utilities Co., Docket No. 5625, March 28, 1994); Wisconsin (Docket No. OS·EI-114).
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Proponents of competition, direct access and therefore, retail wheeling - nonutility
generators, power marketers,164 and large electric customers - are positioned against the
opponents of retail wheeling - utility management who fear the end of the regulated
monopoly,' 6s conservationists and environmentalists who fear the end of the electric power,
societal programs such as demand side management (DSM) and integrated resource planning
(IRP).I66
Unbundling of electric power at the local level will give rise to those issues which are
also being faced by state conunissions in the unbundljng of the natural gas industry:
competition, affiliate relationships, unbundled tariffs, market-based rates, stranded costs,
incentive plans, integrated resource plans and demand side management, core and non core
customers, and the obligation to serve.
_
Of primary importance is the distribution company's obligation to serve. Competition
and direct access alters the traditional obligation to serve. The obligation to serve is "the
foundation for the concept of regulation. However, it presumes that the utility is a
monopoly."167 Under the California Blue Book plan, utilities would retain their duty to
serve customers who continue to receive bundled, tariffed utility service. But the duty to
serve direct access customers would be modified to avoid seriously hampering a utility~s
ability to plan for and reliably serve its remaining customers. 168

164

Power marketers encourage competition alleging "transmission access discrimination (is) an industry-wide
problem requiring an industry-wide solution. Power Marketers Seek Generic Comparability Rule, Energy Daily,
February 17, 1995 at 1. F.E.R.C. determined that an "affiliate will not be permitted to collect market-based rates for
bulk-power sales unless its transmission owner has filed an open-access transmission tariff offering comparable
services (Hermiston Generating Company, L.P., Docket No. ER94-950.000, 69 F.E.R.C. P61,035 (October 13,
1994)). "Comparability" Required For Affiliate Bulk-Power Sales, Fortnightly, November 15, 1994 at 63. Asserting
that quarterly activity and affiliate activity reports inhibit competition, power marketer affiliates are seeking a "lighter"
regulatory hand, more akin to their natural gas marketer affiliate brethren under Order No. 497. Utilities Look To
Enter Power Marketing Business, Energy Daily, November 7, 1994 at 1.
165

Understandably, utility management are concerned about the erosion of their traditional customer base, and
stranded costs, including suggestions that stranded costs be 'shared' by wheeling customers, core customers, and
utility shareholders. How State Regulators Should Handle Retail Wheeling, Fortnightly, February 15, 1995 at 26.
However, the fear of retail wheeling "seems to be declining within the industry as more people realize that discount
pricing and expanding customer bases are the keys to survival in the newly competitive power marketplace." ~
Says Fear Of Retail Wheeling On Decline Within Utility Industry, Electric Utility Week, January 16, 1995 at 5.
156

The surcharges and central planning necessary to support IRP and DSM have no place in a competitive
market. However, conservationists and environmentalists' objectives will be met when competition encourages the
use of fuel-efficient new generating technologies. Studness, Charles, Political Alliances And The Strugele Over
Competition. Fortnightly, Vol. 132, No. 16, September 1, 1994 at 28; Hirst, Eric, Retail Competition Mav Put DSM
Out Of Business, Fortnightly, Vol. 12, No. 17, September 15, 1994 at 14.
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Strand, John, Retail Wheeling: A View From Michigan, Fortnightly, Sept. 15, 1994 at 33.
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!d. at 29. The proposal also requires a twelve month notice period for those customers who wish to .return to
bundled service status or for those bundled service customers who wish to return to direct access status.
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State/Federal Jurisdiction
Electric power industry unbundling issues are compounded by state/federal
jurisdictional conflicts which must be resolved to allow competition at the local level and full
implementation of direct access proposals. Once unbundling of the vertically integrated
electric power industry - driven by comparable service requirements and open access tariffs
- occurs at the transmission level, the line between state and federal jurisdiction over retail
transmission will have to be identified. F.E.R.C. recognizes the need for redefinition of
regulatory responsibilities between state and federal regulators: "Jurisdictional questions are
very very difficult because historically we haven' t had to defme those boundaries." 169
·
The jurisdictional issues have been increased by the uneven application of federal/state
authority over the transmission and sale of electricity. F.E.R.C.'s exercise of its new
authority under the EPAct to order open access transmission on a comparability-of-service
basis encourages competition in the electric industry. The FPA grants th~ F.E.R.C. authority
to determine .just and reasonable rates for the transmission of electricity in interstate
commerce.' 70 However F.E.R.C. is still prohibited from mandating retail wheeling,171 and
it does not have power to authorize construction or expansion of transmission lines.
Without question the federal/state jurisdictional issue has spawned greater obligations
for state regulators to revise traditional modes of regulation to accommodate the emergence of
a robust, competitive, wholesale power market. However, the state commissions are not in
agreement on how to redefine regulatory responsibilities between state and federal regulators.
A Colorado Commissioner believes that "an orderly and equitable shift to a market-based
electric service industry will require federal intervention." 172 A Wyoming Commissioner
believes that "regional and subregional groups - working together to tackle regional amd
subregional problems_.:.. offer better hope of good, rational solutions."173 An Ohio
Commissioner believes that the federal/state joint board process should be used to develop
federal/state policies based on contractual relationships. 174 An Illinois Commissioner
169

Moler Anticipates Sweeping Rule To Restructure Electric lndustrv. Inside F.E.R.C., January 30, 1995 at 1.
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Currently most electricity is transmitted as a bundled sales transaction giving little opportunity to resolve
jurisdictional disputes over transmission rates. Courts have interpreted "interstate broadly to include any transaction
within a single state if the transaction makes use of interconnected transmission lines in which the potential exists for
commingling with electricity from an out-of-state source.• Practically speaking, these holdings give F.E.R.C. "plenary
power over virtually all electricity wholesales in the continental United States." Pierce at 331.
171
Not everyone agrees that states have the authority to order retail wheeling. "The FPA grants the F.E.R.C.
jurisdiction to regulate transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, and several Supreme Court decisions
have made it clear that aU transmission of electric energy by utilities connected to interstate transmission grid is
transmission in interstate commerce." Commissioner Alvarez. Colorado PUC, Fortnightly, November 15, 1994 at 55;
F.E.R.C. General Counsel Tomasky believes that it is a "question of interpretation." F.E.R.C., States Stru!!.gle To Find
Common Ground As West Starts Restructuring, Electric Utility Week, January 23, 1995 at 8.
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believes that the issues should be resolved by the states; "... restrict[ing] F.E.RC.'s
responsibility to interstate movement of energy, with all other questions (stranded investment,
access charges, timing for retail wheeling, and so on) left to local government, where the
impact of those decisions would be most keenly felt" 17s
The federal/state issue embroiled in the competitive realignment of the electric power
industry will be tempered by the "new federalism" led by the Republican Congress which
intends to give more policy responsibility to the states. Power sales are increasingly accorded
the rights of the open market, the electric power industry is operating under new transmission
access regulations, and the F .E.R.C. is acting as arbiter in debates over multi-million dollar
· wheeling transactions across state lines. 176 Perhaps Congress will end this debate with
legislation which clearly delineates the boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction.
It is possible for F.E.R.C. and the states to work out these jurisdictional issues.
Certainly, F.E.R.C.'s disclaimer of authority over retail wheeling in its open access
transmission NOPR was a step forward. However, satisfactory resolution of the electric
power jurisdictional issues may have to be resolved by courts establishing a new "bright line
test that confers on the F.E.R.C. plenary power over ·the rates and conditions of service for all
transactions that use a high voltage transmission line ... , including retail wheeling transactions
and transactions that purport to involve only transmission from one point to another in a
single state. "177 States would retain the exclusive power to require retail wheeling. Several
believe that nothing short of an amendment to the FPA giving F.E.R.C. the same powers with
respect to transmission projects that it has under the NGA for gas pipeline· projects will
resolve the conflict. 178
·
Deregulation Of The Energv Industry
The F.E.R.C. vision of competition and market-based rates in the natural gas industry
discussed in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this paper will be repeated in the deregulation of the electric
power industry. Electric utilities will be disintegrated; generation, transmission and
distribution functions will be unbundled. In response to competition, electric utilities will
downscale, spinoff and spin down assets. Open access, comparability of service and rates will
allow competition on wholesale transmission lines. Retail wheeling, poolco or buy/se11
arrangements will allow customers of all sizes direct access to more inexpensively priced
electric power. Electricity, like natural gas, will become a conunodity offered on NYMEX
with futures trading. By reviewing the process followed by the F.E.R.C. in the deregulation
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Electric Utilities Running Counter To The 'New Federalism' Trend, Energy Daily, January 3, 1995 at 1.
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Pierce supra note 132, at 331.

171

Id at 334. A related movement is afoot to increase competition in the electric power industry by repealing
PUHCA (Public Utility Holding Company Act) and PURPA (Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act). Libertarian
Group With Ties To GOP Calls For Repeal OfPUHCA, PURPA, Electric Utility Week, January 9, 1995 at 5;
Industrials Draw Line In The Sand On PUHCA, PURPA, Energy Daily, February 2, 1995 at 1.
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of the natural gas industry, the path through the deregulation of the electric power industry
will become clear.
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